The Welshman

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS. 1 [In selecting the Opinions of the Press," we are guided solely by a wish to place before our readers the opinions of all parties, without any regard to the relation such opinions may sustain to those of this journal.]

I.I?-,?.1111, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN. I No. IV. I ISOLATION UNSAFE I We showed last week that a policy of isolation would in no degree preserve us from molestation, or from the danger of having on occasion to hold our ground against single enemies and against possible combinations of assailants. And what reason have we to assume that we could stand thus unaided and alone ? or that we could at pleasure, and when danger threatened ns, form those alliances from which we selfishly stood aloof when others only were in peril ? We should not only have left ourselves without a friend—we should have left ourselves without any one whose interest even it would be to succour us. For who would suffer by the fall of a nation which had taken care that no one should benefit by her'grandeur ? Who would lend a helping hand to prolong or uphold an isolated and useless existence ? We had never been of service to others; we had established no freedom; we had enforced no peace we had averted no wrong no nation had us to thank for its independence and integrity; no injured people owed their emancipation to our efforts no one had profited by our past; no one had anything to hope from our future:-what- conceivable motive could any Power have in allying itself with such a mass of cold and systematic egotism ? The weaker States would have no inducement to prevent the destruction of an Empire from whose influence they had never derived either safety or support. The more powerful States would be only too wil- ling to join in the humiliation of a rival and the partition of a prey. We should be unable to play off the jealousies and fears of one nation against another, for diplomacy of that kind is based upon the supposition that we have some inducements to offer for this or that line of conduct in the way of actively forwarding the several objects of those whom we are endeavouring to bribe. Alliances require to be piti-chased:-and %vhat purchase-money can be given by a nation whose system and principle it is to have no po- litical relations with its neighbours ? We should h<tve no friends; and our enemies might probably quarrel over the division of the spoil, but Scarcely over the question whether the victim should be despoiled or not. "But," we shall be told, "it is precisely in our isolated policy that we shall find our safety and our strength. The resources which others will have wasted in armaments and wars, we shall have augmented by commerce and husband- ed by peace. We shall have been growing strong while our rivals have been growing weak. The millions of men and of treasure which they have expended in international quarrels and interventions, we shall have at command, ready to meet the emergency you are contemplating." The plea is good to a certain extent, but it is exaggerated, and it is insufficient. Our policy will not have exonerated us from the necessity of maintaining considerable naval and military forces. We have always our shores to protect against possible invasion we have always our dependencies to defend against actual assaults; we have always a com- merce of unrivalled magnitude to guard from insult, ex- tortion, and injustice. If we were to disband our troops and lay up our ships of war, in what condition would our merchants find themselves in every quarter of the world ?- the victims of every species of oppression—the cause of incessant quarrels and disputes. Our disarmed condition would invite injury and affront; and we should soon find ourselves involved in defensive or retaliatory wars more costly than any armaments. We should even need large forces to enable U8 to maintain and enforce our own policy of supine egotism. All, therefore, that we should save would be the difference between actual hostilities and a reasonable degree of preparation for them—between en- forcing our rights and being always ready to enforce them a material difference no doubt, but one that must not be unduly magnified. There is no question that by confining our fleets and armies to what is necessary for our own de- fence, by leaving the Tagus, the Baltic, and the Euxine to their fate, by sedulously keeping out of every dispute which does not immediately touch our personal interests, by cultivating foreign commerce and internal improve- ments without let or interruption, we may considerably reduce our expenditure and enormously increase our wealth,—we may be able to commission countless frigates and to subsidise innumerable armies,—and our coffers may be far more inexhaustible than those of any of our enemies. But to assume that, therefore, we shall assuredly be able to meet and overcome any danger single-handed, is to jump to a conclusion frQm an estimate of one element only in the question For, in the first place we must not overlook the decay of national spirit which could not fail to ensue from the hearty and deliberate adoption of a purely selfish poli- cy—from the habit of estimating every object according to its money value-from the systematic treading down in our heart every sentiment of sympathy with the suffer- ings and of indignation at the wrongs of others-from coldly and avowedly stifling every emotion of generous compassion or of noble rage. This result-certain as it would be-is one the sum total of which cannot be ex- pressed in numerals but it is one likewise for "hich no hoarded millions could compensate. Napoleon used to estimate the moral to the material force of armies as four to one that proportion is as true at least in politics as in war. But, not to risk ourselves in anything which might seem like declamation,—one consequence of the selfish policy, when once proclaimed by our rulers and adopted by our people, would be the prevalence of a disposition, already too apparent, to calculate the expense of every- thing done or suffered-to submit to every encroachment which it would cost more to resist than to endure-to re- sign whatever would not pay for defending—to resent no insult that was electrotyped with gold-to contract, in a word a habit of facility in conceding any possession or tight or claim that seemed scarcely worth contending for, a habit the more insidious and dangerous because so easily 6loaked and draped under the guise of magnanimity. The truth would soon be made apparent to a reckoning na- tion," that in itself scarcely any claim likely to be contested was worth a quarrel with a valuable customer-that scarcely any encroachment was worth resisting at the ha- zard of a war-that scarcely any dependency would pay for defending it at the cost even of one campaign—that no insult could be so flagrant that it would not be cheaper to pocket it than to repel it. It would be impossible in each individual case to refute the argument or to point out any flaw in the calculation. Mr. Cobden might demonstrate irrefragably that the whole profits of our exports to Tur- key for twenty years ate not equal to the cost of a single expedition to the Dardanelles; that our colonial trade, great as it is, is quite inadequate to repay the cost of the men-of-war we maintain in those distant seas end that to defend the West Indies, which only consume three millions of our manufactures, from an attack by the United States, which consume five million would be a fivefold folly. The estimate may be perfectly correct; the insult in each case might be costly to avenge the en- encroa hment in each case might be an affair of thousands and its defeat an affair of millions ;—yet we might go on thus, never making a single error in our addition sums or our multiplication table, till we were one day awakened from our arithmetic dream to find that the aggregate of all these sappings, and concessions, and trivial defeats, and bit-by-bit enfeeblements, amounted to the sum total of the national honour and the national independence. But-putting aside all this—should we, even with our coffers full of untold treasure and our population undeci- mated by sanguinary wars, be so certainly a match for enemies thirsting for aggrandisement, wild for glory, and passionate for gain ? Supposing that when danger be- came clearly imminent, we should rouse ourselves to meet it as of old, and dream neither of yielding to aggression or of employing our wealth to purchase ignominous peace, what considerations or comparisons should make us fed so confident of victory ? We have not only to face the con- tingency of a single foe, but a possible combination of many foes, gorged with the spoils of those weaker States whom we have abandoned to their avarice insolent with triumph over those ancient allies" whom we have per- mitted them to conquer; strong in that disciplined and practised prowess which we ourselves have suffered to fall into disuse. Now, on the supposition of our having pur- sued the" un-English" policy we are discussing, we shall have three great rivals and antagonists—France, Russia, and America-not as they now are, but as they then will be-with limits far increased, with resources vastly devel- oped, with magnificent positions both for contluest and de- fence appropriated and secured. It will be France with Belgium, Savoy, and the Rhine, and possibly with Italy, or a portion of it, likewise. It will be Russia with Con- stantinople in possession, with Egypt in vassalage, with Persia subdued to be a ready tool to her uherior designs possibly with Denmark to round off her vast dominions. It will be America with Mexico and Cuba. Suppose a war, first, with our nearest neighbour and with her alone. She may then be under a Government unweakened by internal foes, and wielding therefore the undiminished forces of the Republic or the Empire. She may have no conterminous enemies to dread. She will be far less wealthy than we, and less able, therefore, to meet the ex- penditure of a long war—but who shall ensure us that the war will be a long one, or preceded by a long notice ? Her armies are always three or fourfold ours, and will be prompt and hardy by long training, while ours have grown rusted with a vile repose." Her navy is now inferior to ours, but will it be so when a tame and languid policy shall have allowed our Admiralty to slumber at their ease ? If it came to a sharp and sudden struggle, of what avail to us would be our latent resources, our unbounded but un- coined wealth, our ample but dispersed and undisciplined population ? It would be simply so much future safety, which we should never be allowed time to realise—so many long dated and unnegotiable bills, which no one would discount or take in payment. We should be pre- cisely in the condition of a Rothschild in a commercial panic—with millions of unavailable paper in his desk, but without a guinea to pay his washerwoman, or to buy a loaf, or to stave off a gaol. Or supposing our foe be Rus- sia, standing as we hase pictured her, and she probably then would stand, with one foot in the Bosphorus and another on the Sound. It may seem absurd now to re- present her as a dangerous antagonist at a moment when her Asiatic armies are retiring baffled before a far inferior Power, and her European one has been decimated by the valour of the Allies. But those who know her, know that however disorganised and discredited she may now be, she unites several of the most formidable elements of ag- gressive might-a Despot, reigning not against the will, but with the full concurrence of his subjects, and wield- ing, therefore, the whole resources of his Empire, unham- pered by Parliament or Press; a population vast in nu- merical strength and. cheaper almost than sheep or cattle and a national character marked by the two invaluable military qualities—absolute and unreasoning obedience, and stubborn, almost stupid obstinacy. Russian soldiers will fight for their Czar in any cause, and will fight with dogged resolution. They are teachable and imitative in a high degree and their armies combine at once the utmost hardihood of barbarism with the utmost resources of science. Their ships want practice, and their Govern- ment wants money ;-but while we should have to enjoy our hoarded gold in purchasing and training men, they would employ their countless and disciplined forces in conquering gold. Of the two sinews of war, we should have the mightiest and most enduring, but they would have the first and readiest. America we regard as a more formidable foe than either of the others, Not that we need fear even her in a long, stand-up, and forseen fight; but victory, even a drawn re- sult, would be no easy prize. She has, or will soon have, wealth equal to our own she has even greater resources in the future; she has far fewer vulnerable points; she has just the same stamina and pluck on which we, justly enough, rely with so much confidence all that modern science and invention can contribute to warlike capacity she can understand as easily as ourselves and does avail herself of much more promptly and her people, from their serious contest with the difficulties of the desert and the backwoods are far hardier and rougher than our own. This is an advantage which is difficult to estimate too highly. The Americans are aggressive: we are pacific. They love turmoil and excitement: we hate it. War would be a far more dreadful derangement to our tastes and habits than to theirs; and, to crown the whole, their ships are as well built and better manned than ours, and nearly the whole of their male population can handle the rifle as a favourite and famiiiar weapon. Such are the foes against whom we might be called single-handed to defend ourselves,—wealth and traditional glory and ancestral spirit our sole allies—the indolent and luxurious habits that wealth engenders and peace fosters, our worst antagonists. A long contest might save us by reviving our warlike energies' and courage—a long contest might not, however, be vouchsafed to us. But what would be our fate against a union of two or three foes, or any two of them ? How should we face a war with three ene- mies and not a single friend-with no consciousness of merit to nerve our arms or console our disasters-with no conviction of filling a place in the world's system so beneficent and grand that Providence could not compla- cently look upon its vacancy—with no ally to share our struggle or mourn our fall ? What we could do now against any possible array of antagonists, we cannot tell, and we have no wish to boast; but if any one seriously believes that—when the national resources have long been hoarded with a thriftless parsimony, when the national tone had been lowered by deliberately embracing undis- guised selfishness as our political religion-by worship- ping so mean a god and professing so wretched a mortali- ty when our energies had been sapped and let down by two generations of glorious inaction—we should still be able, confiding in our wealth alone, to make head against the united forces of affluence, of ambition, of science, of barbarism, of a multitude of greedy assailants and an ab- solute destitution of devoted friends, we can only say we envy so robust a faith, and would give worlds to think it justified.-Ecoitontist,

TIIE « PARAMOUNT DESTINY." A hundred years ago it was thought "probable that, as I formerly, we should look upon ItassiA ?as the oirl?i.a: gentium." Nearer our own time, we have heard thru civilization was threatened by barbarism, which it un-I doubtedly was; and there have not been wanting those who have more than hinted comparisons between the re- lation of the Russians to Europe and that of the Goths to the Roman Empire. Nay, we have among us a certain class of literary politicians who believe that Europe is -1 used up" and who, finding that the ascendancy of the Sclaves is needed to complete the historic series, forthwith believe in the certainty of Sclave ascendancy. Mr. Glad- stone himself let fall the significant phrase the paramonnt destinies of Russia." We suppose the entry of the Russian troops into Paris, in 1814, was the initiation of the grand Sclavonian epos Seriously, this idea of the paramount destinies of Russia is worth a little consideration. How are they to be accomplished? Not, certainly, after the old fashion of the Goths and the children of Attila; not by the migration of vast hordes, like the Mongols and Tartars under Zinghis or Timour. In these days, undisciplined multitudes, without communications and a commissariat, would inevitably 11 come to grief." The nomade Tartars who swept from Central Asia alike to the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, the Frozen Sea, and the frontiers of Germany, carried everything with them everywhere. Their cirrip was the state they made the war pay for the war they passed like desolation incarnate over the land, and left little but deserts behind. Such achievements are no longer practicable by similar means and if they were, Russia is not the country that could furnish the men to perform them In fact, Russia, although one-seventh of the globe, is by no means such an officina gentium as England and Germany. She does not send forth hordes of men to colonize new countries, like the Anglo-Saxon race. Tile Russian empire does not possess that limitlessness of population as well as territory which was the terror-in- spiring characteristic of the countries beyond the pale of civilization in the old time. Her territories have been mapped, her tribes named, her people numbered. Far from being an inexhaustible hot bed of men, you shall read in the pages of Tengoborski, her distinguished economist, lamentations that her people are too few; that inexorable limits are placed to their growth in the laws of production that, except in specially favoured districts, the relative density of her population to her productive soil can never attain the same figure which it reaches in the most populous countries in Europe." Other states may aug- ment population beyond the scope of the natural produc- tive forces of their territory, but in so vast an empire as that of Russia, and with such a geographical position, the progress of population must essentially depend on the abundance of the products of the soil." The sixty mil- lions of men in European Russia and the five millions in Asiatic Russia are barely enough for the purposes of vigorous national life. Take these facts: in sixteen governments there is not one town to a hundred square miles of surface, and in two of the sixteen there is not one town in a thousand square miles of surface. In the government of Astrakan, there is but one town in iL5 square miles; in that of Wologda, one to 536; in that of Olonetz, one to 398; in that of Stavropol, one to 373; in that of Perm, one to 370. The governments in which the relative number of towns is greatest, that is, where we reckon one town to less than 50 square miles, are seven in number, namely, the kingdom of Poland, the governments of Moscow, Grodno, Koursk, Toula, Kalouga and Courland." Russia is inhabited by an average population of 617 to the square mile in England and France, whose united population is a little above that of Russia, there is an average of upwards of 4500 to the square mile. In Russia there are 10,000 square miles of unpenetrated forests, and out of 95,710 square miles of territory only 29,757 are under cultivation. It is estimated that there are only 2083 persons to every square mile of productive soil—that is, three times as much productive soil for each inhabitant as in France.* These facts show what room there is for the expansion of Russia in Russia so that if she doubled her population in sixty-years, as M. Tengoborski calculates there would still be one-third more of productive land to each inhabitant than there is now in France. But this increase, as M. Tengoborski never fails to repeat,"must always depend more or less upon the progress of cultiva- tion, and on the successive developmeut of the productive forces of the country." If allowed, there seems no reason to doubt that the Russians would increase. "If," says Mr. Danby Seymour, the military organization of Russia could be once broken up, the people would turn to their natural pursuits, which are decidedly comnercial and agricultural. The most singular thing is, that the people among whom this military organization of the whole nation prevails [one man in fifteen a soldier] i.»', without exception, the most pacific people on the face of the earth." We may add to this the fact, that the Rus- sians are not a migratory but a home-keeping people. There are, therefore, two tendencies in operation,—one directed to the cultivation of the soil and the development of the resources of the country; the other stretching atvay towards the realization of those vast designs which are to constitute, we suppose, the" paramount destiny." The farmer is the popular, the latter the political tendency. There is ever going on an inarticulate struggle between the two and it is becausp the latter has got the upper hand that there is war between Russia and the West. Hence, production is checked, and population is diminish- ed, nearly a half per cent of the annual estimated increase. These are some of the causes that are likely to adjourn the" paramount destinies." Russia is far more dangerous, under her present rule, in peace than in war. She never fights with a strong power until she is forced to fight but she is ever ready to fight with a weak power, if her ends cannot be compassed less expensively and ostentatiously. If she subjugate Europe, it will be by plots and wiles. Her aim, while assiduously- cultivating her resources, has been, partly by force, but chiefly by guile, to obtain controlling positions—such as Sebastopol tvas, as Poland and Transcaucasia are, as Constantinople and Finmaik would be. She could not afford, even if she desiretl, to send out undisciplined multitudes to conquer and regenerate Europe, Goth and Tartar fashion nor would she willingly have risked disciplined multitudes but she could send out legions of spies, yards of riband, scores of orders, and other bribes, and, hovering on the selvage of civilization, crib a bit here and a bit there, and now and then, when nobody seemed to be looking, snatch at some larger piece either of in- fluence or territory. Thus the "paramount destinies" were promoted every day until they were far on the road to fulfilment; when degenerate Europe showed a little public spirit, and threw herself between Russia and the destined prey, M. Tengoborski's calculations for other countries, as well as Russia, are in all cases based or. the geographical mile of four minutes of the Equator, or fifteen to a de- gree."—Spectator.

PROPOSALS FOR PEACE. (From the Spectator.) I Rumours of renewed negotiation for peace, begun or to be begun, though perhaps traceable in their origin to the Bourse at Paris, have acquired an extension and a degree of modified credence which constitute in themselves a political fact. We find the reports current in well- informed society," in the City, in the press they meet with qualified denials, a good deal of belief, and small explanation. They evidently owe their paternity to the Continent; and there accordingly we find them take the most connected form, in a story which is at least plausible. It is told in the lndependance Belge, formerly a Russian organ, but latterly supposed to have been converted to the v iews of the existing Government of France. According to this account, the King of Prussia had invited Austria to join in calling forth from the Germanic Diet a grand manifestation in favour of peace; but Austria replied by pleading her restraints under the treaty of December [2. On this Prussia attempted a new and supreme effort at I St. Petersburg"; and the Czar resolved on transmitting new overtures to Vienna, by General Stackelberg. In another quarter it is reported that Austria, according to annual custom, is now engaged in a fresh endeavour to renew negotiations between the Western Powers and Russia; and in the Globe of Friday we find an article telling us, apparently on authority,"thatrthere 'Imve been "indirect attempts to terminate hostilities," but that the conditions suggested are ;not,admiss;* ble. It is a probable conjecture, that to save his dignity, the Emperor of Russia has not ventured to transmit proposals direct, lest they should be rejected, but has made Austria the me- dium of inquiring whether the propositions would be accepted if offered. The reply seems to have been in the negative, with an intimation that Russia must bid higher. But there are not wanting circumstances which give at least verisimilitude to reports of a leaning to a conclusion of peace on Russia's own terms. Whether or not there is a split in our Cabinet, unquestionably some members of it have talked in a manner calculated to awaken suspicion. The operations on the Paris Bourse would be explained on the supposition that the Emperor lis in need, and is covertly moving towards a peace. When the exhibitors of the Great Exposition took their departure, the Emperor Napoleon gave them a kind of massage to their couutry- men, especially in Germany, hinting that if their Govern- ments did not hasten to declare on one side or the other, they must take the consequences. This looked highly belligerent, and conclusive as to the Emperor's purpose of continuing the war with renewed vigour; but Count Walewski, his Foreign Minister, has" since transmitted to the representatives of France at certain courts an explana- tion of this speech with neutralizes it. The Minister's circular is a paraphrase of the Imperial original, but in mild, almost dulcet phrase hinting that the speech will make no difference in the rel itions of France with neutral courts. Much, is made, too, in some quarters, of the fact that the Allies do not push the war in the Crimea that the French Government has withdrawn some of its troops; and that the Czar has not only visited Sebastopol, but has taken steps to construct a railway from Baktchi-serai to Simpheropol, as if he counted upon not ultimately being disturbed in the permanent possessions of the country. All these appearances might probably, if Parliament were sitting, be explained away they are not inconsistent with the distinct pledge that the war will be prosecuted next year, in the Black Sea with increased energy, and in the Baltic with an animation not hitherto displayed, in a way to meet expectation. But Parliament is not sitting, and the coincidence of great facts and rumours must stand in the place of information. The balance of pressures would appear to be in favour of going forward. Whatever may be her concession to German urgencies, Russia shows no signs of giving way The boastful assurance promulagated by a St. Petersburg journal, that the Russian power is unimpaired, the ostentatious visit of the Emperor Alexander to the Crimea, and his address to the soldiers, indicate no appreciation of peace as a necessity. It is conceivable that circumstances might render it impracticable for our Ministers to go on. Though the good faith of allies might hold out, their means might not. The further we advance, the less can we discern a distinct issue of the contest. We have not made up our minds how permanently to curb the power which Russia refuses to submit to the public law; we have not resolved how to dispose of the Crimea—how to yield it, to hold it, or to keep it neutral. The Western Powers stand between the two difficulties of having preluded themselves from making any territorial acquisition, and of having so broken off the negotiations as to preclude renewal on the four points." We have not attained a position from which we could dictate terms; and Russia shows no readiness to discount our further means of coeicing her. A short cut to peace would appear a short cut out of these conflicting difficulties" and it would be quite natural if responsible statesmen were glad of the earliest opportunity simply to desist. But the attention of the public in this country having, though slowly if not unwillingly, been drawn to the progressive encroachments of Russia, by which she induced mortal" sicknesses" in her neighbours in order to* seize their inheritance, the whole community has settled upon the conviction that it will not" pay" to suffer the continuance of that state of things that it must be effectually terminated, at the cost of any necessary outlay. Here would be the most formidable obstacle to an imperfect peace. We have had many oportuuities lately fur drawing out the sentiments of the people. At elections, t meetings of representatives with their constituents, at non-political meetings, nay, at intended Peace meetings," the verdict has been the same. The addresses from municipalities presented' to the King of Sardinia, may be described in a phrase, as having by anticipation echoed his declaration in the Guildhall, that the sword having been once unsheathed, we cannot lay down our arms until an honourable and therfoie durable peace has been secured." Mr. Henley, a "good old Tory," but a thorough Englishman, put the popular feeling forcibly and truly when he said at Oxford, that if the country were to bring the war to a conclusion before it has grounds for doing so, all the blood and treasure would be wasted," and many a man present would live to see the fight begin over again." Now that is just what the public thinks it best to prevent. (From the Economist.) The most exaggerated statements have been circulated with a degree of confidence that has given them some cur- rency, that proposals had been made by Russia to the Western Powers of distinct terms upon which she is pre pared to make peace. On the other hand, it has been denied, apparently on authority, that any such communi- cation has been received from Russia. But then it is insinuated, that though that may be literally true, yet that Austria is only the organ through which Russia has elected to intimate her wishes, and that they may therefore practi- cally be regarded as the proposals of Russia It would be a hopeless task to attempt to fathom the depths of diplo- matic mystery, and therefnre it would be rash to say positively that no understanding exists between Austria and Russia with regard to these transactions. All that we know i, that those who ought to be best informed on the subject, both in Vienna and in Paris, believe that the proposals originated with Austria alone, and that in the German Courts it is even aserted that Russia will disregard any overtures made to her by the Court of Vienna. If this be true, and we have no reason to doubt it, then the prospect of peace at this moment would appear to be based upon grounds certainly not more substantial than those upon which last year we built our hopes after the Treaty of the 2nd of December. It appears not unnatural, that when the campaign of arms comes to a conclusion, and our troops have returned into winter quarters, that of dip- lomacy should begin, and fill up the void of excitement and interest in the political word. The strongest adherent of the war will not object to this, if negotiations are only undertaken in earnest, with a full appreciation of the actual position of both parties to the contest, with a right estimate of the ends to be attained, and of the sacrifices already made to secure them. But we own, when we look back upon the dreary waste of negotiations and conferences through which we were dragged a year ago, and when we reflect upon the narrow escape which we then had from a conclusion as disgraceful as it would have been disastrous, we regard with extreme suspicion the voluntary inter- position of Austria at the present juncture. The eagerness which the Western Powers then showed to negotiate cer- tainly had not the effcct of disposing Russia more to terms for at last it became evident that from the first Russia was not in earnest, but only made apparent concessions, with; the view of gaining time, and of finally breaking off when I it suited her. If the course which we then pursued was inexcusable, a similar one would be doubly so now. We may rest assured, if Russia is to be brought to terms, it will not be by the Western Powers shewing too much eagerness for peace, or by their readiness to tall in with every proposal for negotiation that may be made. But, we would ask, in what light does Austria now stand as a negociator ? A year ago she he!d a position which justly entitled her to exercise that proud function. On the one hand she acknowledged a sympathy with the cause of the Western Powers, and made strong professions of a desire to aid them in its accomplishment. With so much as we had then to hope from Austria, we were justified in making some sacrifices to consult her wishes and to meet her views. In like manner, on the other hand she pro- fessed disapproval of the conduct of Russia an'! that Power, unwilling to encounter her enmity, was willing to make some concessions to her. But what was the end of the hopes of the Allies on the one. hand, and of the fears of Russia on the other ? Both equally vanished. As far as the former were concerned, she shuffled out of the treaty of December by the most literal interpretation of its obli- gations, altogether disregarding the spirit in which she knew it had been accepted; and as regards the latter, she quietly acquiesced in the refusal of Russia to accept terms approved by herself, and in place of joining the Allies in active hostilities, disbanded her army, and left the whole Russian forces free to act against the Western Powers in the Crimea. Since that moment the Allies have ceased to hope anything from Austria; and Russia has ceased ti fear. She has thus entirely disqualified herself to be a negotiator On the one side, her promises will be but lightly respected on the other, her threats will be even more lightly regarded. But it is alone upon the offices of a neutral Power in this position that the chances of peace at this moment depend, and we feel bound to say that we place no confidence whatever in them. We believe that those who do, will find themselves grievously disappointed. (From the Morning Post). I Austria never had much real intention, if by acts in- tentions may be judged, of going to war; but now she seems determined to leave no doubt as to the sincerity of her pacific views. A telegraph brings ns the important information that Austria has placed the whole of her army with the exception of the corps in the Danubian Princi- palities, on a peace footing. This* would argue her belief in the probable efficacy of the negotiations which are on foot, and in which she has been a prime mover. Such a step as that just taken by the Cabinet of Vienna would seem to prove that Austria has good ground for thinking that Russia is willing to accede to terms, such as she re- presents herself ready to urge upon her. However this may be, it is certain that no peace would be safe-no negotiations satisfactory—which did not clearly and un- mistakeably give to us all that we have won at so much cost. We have obtained by our arms the complete control, moral and physical, of Russia. But we have yet to enforce her full submission to that control for the future; and that submission must be guaranteed, not only by solemn treaties, but by unmistakeable facts. No Sebastopol in the Black Sea-no Bomarsund in the Baltic must ever again threaten the integrity of neighbouring States-no Russian fleet may ever again darken the Euxine, ready at any moment to bear down on Constantinople, to destroy the peace of Europe, and place its safety in jeopardy. Protectorates must be abandoned together with all preten- sions to meddle with the goods, or with the subjects, of other Sovereigns. Not only should the waters of the Danube be free throughout their course, but their outlet must be released from the grasp of Russia, who must be compelled to give up the possession of the mouths of the Danube. Unless such terms as these be agreed to by Russia, let there be no peace but let us in the approach- ing campaign use all that overwhelming force with which we are now armed for the achievement of victory. Russia suffers throughout her empire. Her imperial banks are already beginning to suspend cash payments, and her raw recruits will ill represent the masses of disciplined soldiers she once possessed, but of which such a fearful proportion has been sacrificed in the present war But to suffer is not to submit, and we require tangible demonstration of the submission of Russia to the terms, which are not our terms," vindictive terms, or terms of conquest, but the terms," the only terms upon which the security of Euro- pean society can be solidly founded. When to these con- ditions, and their necessary consequences, Russia at length accedes, we shall gladly welcome her accession But we must observe that, to all negotiations hitherto undertaken, Russia has brought a double purpose, not an honest desire to seek a pacific solution, but a determination, as subtle as vigorous, to overreach the opponents she cannot overcome and therefore due caution must be used in giving her another opportunity. With regard to the German Powers, Prussia has never deceived any one but herself, in giving herself an imaginary importance whilst committing political suicide. Austria, however, has played a more prominent part, and, without risking the lives of her gallant soldiers, has procured for them good quarters, and a license too free in those unfortunate Principalities, for whose continued distraction they are themselves a material guarantee." If Austria believes in peace if she has such good authority for believing that Russia will accede to the terms that she urges-that she reduces her armies to a peace establish- ment—her first duty should be, to take steps for the evacu- tion of the Danubian Principalities which Russia, in any case, can no longer menace, and which she herself, by this very reduction of her forces, admits will not now require her armed defence. I (From the Illustrated London News.) The rumours of rtmewed negotiations for peace, have ac- quired additional strength and consistency within the last few days The wintry weather that impedes both naval and military operations is propitious for diplomacy. When the sword is idle, the tongue becomes industrious; and the Gortschakoff of Vienna assumes importance whenever the greater Gnrtschakotf of Sebastopol is forced into inactivity by the elements. The opinion has gained ground in well- informed circles that peace is far more probable to result from any negotiations that may be renewed during the winter than it was at any former lull of the great war- tempest. We trust that these anticipations will be realised but, until the public knows exactly from what quarter the propositions for peace are to emanate, it will do well to be prepared for a continuance of the war. If it be merely Austria and Prussia who offer to mediate, because the war imperils and distresses them, it is not likely that any good will come of their interference. Their services are not required and, if offered, will be received with cold polite- ness, and no more. But, if these Powers are really moved by the Emperor Alexander to negotiate in his behalf, the Governments and people of Great Britain and France will not only be ready but anxious to listen. Any reasonable propositions, proceeding directly or indirectly from the Russian Government, will be received with attention and respect. The Allies fight neither for glory nor for gain- but for the independence of nations and the public law of Europe. If Russia wishes to terminate the war, and will give adequate security against renewed aggression on Turkey, the Allies are too just and generous, and too deeply aware of their mighty responsibilities to the present and future Time, to continue the war for any purposes of so- I called glory or the still worse purposes of revenge. One thing must be firmly impressed on the minds of the diplomatists—Russian, Prussian, Austrian,' and any other 1 who may in the course of events be called upon to debate this great question—that there is an end of the Four Points" which were discussed at Vienna in April last. .0 They are dead and non-existent, and cannot be revived, The chariot-wheels of Victory have driven over them, and their memory alone remains, to show the Emperor of Rus- sia how favourable an opportunity he let slip and what sacrifices and humiliations he might have spared himself and his country if he had at that time taken a true estimate of his position and his dutte He has since the breaking up of the Vienna Confereylegrput forth all his strength, and been defeated. Calamity has met him on every side. He has had a first-rate General; but he has been foiled. And-worse than all defeats that could have been inflicted by the arms of such great Powers as England and France —he has been beaten ignominously by the Turks, whom he had taught his people to depise. His prestige is gone. The nations of Europe no longer stand in awe of his power, and those of Asia no longer consider him invincible. Turn where he will he finds no friend that he can be as- sured will not speedily become his foe. He is not even sure of the allegiance of Prussia, much of less of Austria and the naval Powers that hold and guard the entrances of the Baltic are half, if not wholly, disposed to give to the cause of England and France the support of their fleets and armies in addition to the sympathies of their people, which were given long ago. The longer the war lasts, the greater the sacrifices he must make, and the humiliations he must endure. The Allies have not put forth a half or even a tithe of their strength. They have not only re- sources in reserve but a battle-cry which, if they did but utter, as they might, would arouse against him hosts of internal as well external enemies who as yet have made no I move. All these things he must know, if he be of sane and unprej udiced mind; and the knowledge must predis- pose him to listen to the prudent counsels of his friends in Prussia and Austria, who, if they hate England and France, hate war much more-friends that sit in powder- magazines, and cannot but be alarmed when the Allies run to and fro with lighted torches, and may, intentionally or unintentionally, cause a conflagration in which their thrones may perish. Unfortanately it cannot by any means be taken for granted that the Emperor of Russia is in this reasonable frame of mind, and that he regards his prospects unswayed by passion or by desperation. If he were, it would not be difficult for the diplomacy of England and France to fix a minimum of concession, on his adhesion to which the war might be brought to a termination honourable to the Allies, safe for Turkey and all Europe, and as little as possible humi!iating to the pride and self-love of the Russian r people, Such a minimum, if proposed now, would include | Six great Points:—?fs<, a complete and absolute renuncia- tion by Russia of all claim of interference with the civil position of the Greek or any other Christians in Turkey; I second, the erection of Wallachia and Moldavia into free I States, paying their tribute to the Sultan, but holding their I place in the European commonwealth, as Switzerland does, under the joint protection of all Europe third, the abso- Inie freedom of the Danube to the commerce of all nations fourth, the razing to the ground of the fortresses of Sebas- topol, north side and south side fith, a prohibition-to which Austria and Prussia should be parties, in common with England, France, Turkey, and Sardinia—rendering it a casus belli if Russia should erect, or cause to be erected, any naval fortress whatsoever in the Crimea and sixth, the limitation of the Russian fleet in the Euxine to such a number of vessels as might be considered by all the Powers sufficient for the legitimate protection of Russian commerce, and insufficient for any aggression against Constantinople, or any other part of the Turkish territory. Less than these Six Points the Allies could not accept as bases of any permanent pacification but more than these they would be, in strict justice to themselves, entitled to demand, if the overtures of peace were made immediately. But the question of indemnification, if too galling to Russian pride, might perchance be waived, provided that Russia in good faith acceded to the Six Points we have named, and gave adequate security for the fulfilment of her contract. The terms of the winter of 1855 will not keep. Time will destroy and spoil them, and produce new claims for con- sideration. Victory with its sword will dictate in the long days a higher price than would be accepted by Diplomacy with its pen in the short ones; and the winter of 1856, if the war last so long, will produce a minimum infinitely more formidable than the one thus briefly sketched-a minimum inclusive, perh&ps, of the restoration both of Poland and of Finland, and possibly of the Crimea and of Bessarabia. If, as we said before, the overtures for peace really come from Russia herself, there will be no insuperable difficulty. If, however, they come from Austria or Prussia, without Russian consent, the war must work itself out to its proper ( issues; and the German Powers must either stand inglo- f riously aside, as they have long done, or enter into the j quarrel on one side or the other. England and France will neither court them in the one case, nor fear them in the other. I HIGH LIFE.-In London, females who are a great deal in society in the season, like a man who drinks, can't stop; they are at it all the time, and like him, sometimes forget the way home.-Sam Slick. I