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'Grasp the nettle boldly, and it does not jting. Attacking Oil tnat principle, and 4rith the aid of tne tremendous factors of curprisc ilid II L y, which explain the un- tiampied rapidity nnu dimensions of the Austro-Gernian successes in Italy, Sir Julian fcyng and hiz, Third Army—an ajl British islands Army—havo achieved one of the inc;t sudden and sweeping coups 01 ;he whole war. Attacking on a front of 'thirty miles between the Sea roe, near Arras, jtrid St. Quentin, thrusting towards St. Quentin in the south and (Junobrai. in the north, and the valley of the ScheIdt-which Jinks the present battlefield with the goal of kur desires, Antwerp—our Third Army in one great blow swept clean away the Hin- denburg or Seigfned line, of fabulous strength, taking advanced line, main line, And support line, storming villages almost by the dozen, reaching within easy range of Cambrai, and opening up the richest hopes for the near future. What, it took us upon the Somme vast slaughter and months of efforts to achieve, the penetration on a nar- row front of the enemy s permanent defences, we attained in one day, and with little loss, How was it done ? Surprise and mobility. Surprise was the predominating circumstance 0" which explains this victory, perhaps. The orthodox trench warfare battle begins with a long artillery preparation, lasting many! -weeks, and an infinity of labour and study in the preparation. The enemy, of course, masses men and guns to meet the anticipated; onslaught, and when it is delivered, after it-P initial successes, it is checked and cven- tually stopped. On the Scarpe-St. Quentin front there was no such preparation (which incidentally saves the country seme millions of pounds) The enemy never expected an attack. This front had been somnolent since the battles of April and May. There had been nothing more than an occasional trench' raid and artiTlfery "strafe." The main mass: of the British Army find of the German Army had been attracted to Flanders, where a prolonged-and bloody struggle was gradually dying down. The Germain line was lightly held. It had been stripped of aeroplanes (only five were seen on the battle- front, a most important fact). Mi&nce was pl ced in the innate strength of the defences to hold up any sudden attack until the men, who are the real strength of the defencc, I could be amassed in adequate strength. The line itself basked in the prestige of the men who baptised it. Acres and thickets, of wire, olid masses of concrete, dug-outs deeper than any shell ever dived into mother j earth, labour-saving battle machinery, and machine-guns in profusion—in all these the hope A'as placed for repelling any at- tempted surprise until the normal defensive methods of the massing of men and guns could be brought into operation. Even 1 though the German line at this point was weak in men and artillery, the decision of Sir Julian Byng required the highest moral courage. No attempt was made to level the defences by artillery fire; and tharfc meant that if the tanks, which were to be the sub- stitute for an artillery preparation, did not gchieve all that could be expected of them,! the risk was run of a great massacre of our men, held up in front of the acreages of bed wire. I' The Germans (and we, for that matter), I had forgotten all abcttjt the tanks. Frankly,, we have been a little disappointed with the latter this year, after what we had seen of I their actual achievements on the Somme. On the Scarpe-St. Quentin front, where herds of thest moneters (l been collected, they had a fafr field. and a certain amount of favour There was ro grtct artillery cor- j cervtration to make each the target for iâmi; of shells gi&fciid ifrm;-dry* a rolling open. pWi^ the antithesis of the, noisome, shell-riddled bogs of Flanders—a clean, wholesome country, not a devil's lough of despond. And there were num- bers of the tanks, far more than we ever saw on, the Somme. So, when they rolied, forward in the dim dawn of last Tuesday, all. things favoured them, and all that we had been led to hope for from their achievements j on the Somme was attained. They rolled down miles of the wire; they squirmed up to and silenced the machine-gun points; they annihilated every physical obstacle to the advance of our infantry, and all that the latter were called upon to do at the outset was to pour over the firm springy turf and garrison the lines where the dazed remnants of the enemy were crouching. Surprise and mobility; the battle was a pie-eminent exhibition of both. The element of mobility lay in the hardness of the ground, the dry weather and the speed of the tank. In a day we were five miles behind the I enemy's permanent lines; on the bomme that advance took, at least two months of most bloody battle. So far deep had we I gone, so clear and free of the hampering trenches and wire, that our cavalry in large numbers poured forward and galloped here, [ there and everywhere, and stretched their cramped limbs in a gloriaiii and most rare freedom. In the result the Hindenburg line; disappeared; what lies before us we do not know, but we are justified in hoping that we have broken in twodnys the back of the most arduous work in this region, and t-hat If we desire a break through—and why in heaven's name should not that be a legiti- mate aim of all our operations in France— we have the finest opportunity of effecting I it that we have ever had so far in the West. Let us pray, therefore, that Byng will be, tHe to develop his great success with the same rapidity as Mackensen exhibited on the tsonzo. It would be deeply disappointing If we were again to halt, when on the verge bf clear country, and wait for the enemy to tummon op his reserves, throw up freah de- fences, and eventually halt us again. Let tte pray that Byrig will push bit with all the speed he may; and that even as Mackensen I rolled at Cadorna's line Byng may be able 'to 41fect the, same breathlessly speedy and start-link"rev.olution in the West. Why not We have a uniquely favourable chance of I bringing it about. It has got to be done 80m.. tUlt6 or we shall never win the war. There are manv points about this vic- tory, which so radiantly brightens up a ?ky that had been gloomy and lowering enough; in all conscience, which call for attention. The Hindenburg line was weak, not only in men, which may have been due to deliberate policy, but in aeroplanes. We can under- stand that the enemy should have taken a t risk in the matter of men, and it is not neces- sarily explained by the theory that Flanders and Italy have left him without the power to maintain adequate local re- terves. But there should always have been, maintained on so great a sector a corta-ini equipment of aeroplanes to maintain a daily irigil. Hardly a sign, however, was noted: nt the outset of the enemy'a aerial service, j Only two machines were met with at all on; the opening day. The only inference is tjbat, despite the bravo show they make, the, ahemy. is. hi reality hard pressed for r machine?. He can be strong enough at the obviously salient points. But he has noth- tnji in hand for the points that are not J tobvio»wly salient He has in this case been convicted of denuding an important rtreteli nf line of one essential part of its equipment.. A case can be made out for denuding it of 111"11, hijt. that very circumstance should only have sharpened the alertness of the: l/v>k-ont. But it was not sharpened it, was biniifed a proper complement- of aircraft] was lacking. Snrnrifx* such as Bync effected nitist bo rare, but they hold wrt;. when successfully brought- nfL opportunities ns rich as they are rarn If the German line had been ntrongly manned gunned, surprise would have been almost impossible: the tanks would have had to advance against "nbrokon for- tifications into a deadly IStorm of shells. Again, the ground must be hard, permit- ting of good going. It was so in this case. The Scarpe-St. Quer.tin httack, with its dis- tinctive feature ot the entire replacement of t artillery by the tank, bears out, moreover, I that the immense accumulation of heavy guns and artillery may in certain unusual conditions be dispensed -:t-h, and that there is only one alternative to its most thorough use—and that is no use at all, upon the scale with which we have become familiar prior to an attack. We had either to bombard for many days, and so give away the secret of the attack, or attack without bombardment and depend for the destruction of obstacles, inert like wire or animate and active like machine- gun points, upon something else, which we possessed in the tanks. Sir Julian Byng, de- spite the moral courage which the ordering of a surprise attack calls for from a general, thus shows that he acted, nevertheless, not only with a splendid audacity, but with a calculating thoroughness which establishes for him a very high reputation. He elected on a surprise, because all the conditions were propitious, and the risks of his strategy were minimised as much as possible. All i that remains for him to round off the vic- tory in triumph is to exploit it as speedily I audruthlesslyas possible. He is a cavalry- man, and there lies before him as such a field for the cavalryman's characteristics of swiftness of movement as any general has had in the West in the last three years. ——— -———

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