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The reply of the Allies to the Note which President Wi'on recently addressed to them, as well us to the Central Powers, re- questing the belligerents to state the objects for which they fought, answers Note. The German reply did not. We have a clear idea of the general t<;nour of the Allied de- 4vit,4itU <md siims 4iut the -Get'ft'tanRthetrt- selves have no idea, of the purpose to which they propose to turn their conqueatE. The Allied Note declares that pen-ce would be to-day prematurn: it challenges the analogy which President Wilson instituted on thn basis of vague declarations by leaders of the Centra,! Powers: it recapitulates the enormities which have marked the war ma-king of the allies of G'er- ma.ny as weU as Germany itself: Mid' it rocitPR the heads of the Allied ,tlie liberati,-)ii of invaded Allied terri- tory, with compensation; the liberation of Italian, Slav, Rumanian, Cxech iiiid Slavonic peoples. and the Syrian, Armenian and Ara- bian communities under Turkish rule ftom their present subjection; and the reorganisa- tion of Europe on the basis of the rights of nationalities, with full/iecurity for then- free economic development. And there is a formal repudiation of any desire to attempt the impossible'—the "extermination" of the Germanic peoples—or what might be feasible, their political extinction. A European upheaval upon l;n<'s iore- jshadowed from the first is indicated in ttns statement. The peace ma.p of the Allies, involving the aggrandisement of some of them and the curtailment of the enemy's power, is more difficult to work out in practice than to fashion 'In theory. Certain of the Allied aims—as the expul- sion of the Turks from Eiircl,e- d-1, not r°st upon the national principle afT all; other conditions are as conspicuously applicable to the enemy's case as to that of the Allies. An Italian Trieste would be incompatible with the guarantee of free economic development of, amongst others, a Czech nation as well as of the other nationalities which make up the Austro- Hunga)-;f)n Em- pire, ..without certain specific agreements. And the mixture of nationalities renders it extremely dimcult to satisfy a)I national claims without injustice tu some large min- ority of a different nationality, or other, the more particularly as we have no re::son to bplieve that there is much respect or toleration for the liberties of other? any- where in Europe. Thf Jewish population of Rumania, for instance, did not present a model of tolei'nnre before the war. Nevertheless, the application of the national principle will go further to secure a 'nore stable Europe, and to diminish the potentla[ causes of strife, than the order which preceded tllet war. A mosaic of small States—a smaller Austria. and Hun- gary. an independent Bohemia, an enlarged Rumania, an expanded Serbia, or a.n adjacent new Slavonic State—all offer n rich field fo,- the intriguer, and will have their national amnit:{'s towards this or the other biggt'l" Power. But the power for aggression of the German and Austro-Hnngal'inn Em- pires, an aggression conducted 'argelv with the aid of the cannon tedder of tho French- men. in heart, of A!sace, the Danes of ex, tremp Northern Schleswig, the Poles of East Prussia, besides the Rumanians and various Slavonic peoples of the ¿<\ u<:tro-Hungarian Empire, will be seriously cut u)t:). Germany herself will p'obably remain as formidable ever, and increasingly formidable in re- Fpect to France; but it should be practicable to put it out of question fo<' German mili- tarism to be broached again on so immense a scale. It ie to be noted, however, that vin- dication of the principle of nationality ceases in .enemy territory. S'jch a partial settlement will leave still an acute national question in certain quarters of Europe-the acuter from the spectacle of the emancipation enjoyed in othe" cases. Nor will every detail of the re-fa,shioned Europe be elaborated xi harmony with the broad principles -la.id down there will have to be certain radica.1 exceptions. The one point in the Allied Note that is open to criticism is that their liR-t of wrongs to be righted -Mid redressed is so great and imposing that it is difficult to un- derstand why it was sought to keep the peace when so many things were amiss in Buropp. Until July, 1914. th<! most ner- vous anxiety of European statesmen, of the Entente as wel! as of the Cental Powers. was to preserve t-h"b condition in which amongst others, peoplea lay beneath the murderous tyranny of the Turk." And the emulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Em- Pill ich has proved itself -,o aHen to Western civUisa.ticn," was tnc nrght- mare of t'hese same st6Aerineii, A cynicaj and cowardly diplomacy strove A cymcal a.nd cowardly dlP omacy strove before the war to preserve a Europe which the Allies have now determined should tie altered and reformed from top to bottom; and the desire of both sides was to avoid firing the nrst ghot that would commence a connict offering at least the prospect of right- ing these manifold wrongs. There ig a cer- tain lack of moral courage in admitting the existence of certain evils—as they a.re now admitted—and in shrinking from a.ny effort to remedy them. On the Allied c<ise there wa.g clear warrant fcr a war taking the form of an organised a.tta.ck upon Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey; but there was no such org-anised attach ever plamied or dreamed of. The events and developments of the war, bringing in nation after nation, I'ave ledj however. to a conthination being formed for a.ims which would otherwise have been left in complete abeyance. There are no rtils that France would ever have foug-ht 'Germany on the single i.ssue of Alsace and Lorra-ine that Italy or Rumania would ever hHve made a suicidal attack upon Austria-Hungary, whcsc forces were at the outset, before so gigantically depleted by the disasters indicted by Russia, far superior to both. And as for Turkpy, up to the very eve of the Turkish entrance into the wa.T the Alties were ma'king asf-ut'ances to the h Gcvennnent (forgetful of its past) concernin.g' its territorial integrity if it re- mained neutral. But events like the mas- sacre of Armenians, and the brutal mal- treatment of the Syrian population, as welt as Turkey'.s cwn deliberate acceptance c'f the fortunes of war by the entrance into a game c'f .gains or forfeits, 'knocked upon the head th.tt particular piece of Allied oppor- tunism. The contract, between the Europe th&t wa. before August, 1914, a.nd the avowed aim of the diplomacy of a.U countries to maintain the p-eace. and the Europe that is to be, so different from t.he.former, indicates a rottenness in stat.e'smanshp', a cowardice in the refusal to face unpleasant tacts that does not deserve to be passed over in silence. Hut the events since that fa.tefnl August have, as a ma-tter of fact; revolution- ised all the ancient order of ideas a.nd what we imagined to he our knowledge. It was desirable, for instafce, to endeavour to keep Turkey upon ity legs so long a.s, its subject races were exposed to no more than. the nor- mal experiences of an Oriental Government because ove-r a partitioning of Turkey and a. quarrel over the spoils Europe might be set in tlame. And even those of us who foresaw the German peril could not con- ceive that the German sp'rit was tigerish in its ferocity. Soms of our diplomatists were ignorant. some foolish, and there were uTjcredible blunderers amongst the heads of our own Government as It wa.s then but the most ignor&nt, foolish and the most short- sighted c-f our advisers could bf pardoned for not imagining that the Germans could m&ke war with fuch fr;-gli:tftii M'd calculated ?? ? ? ???? ? Ite::Ch ;totk that will" not! bear analysis. Even ?tr. Lloyd George I ma.kes the anirmation that millions of our men who enrolled Hi the Army erji?ted ? after the German victories cf Aueust, 1914, when they knew the accumula/ted and con- centrated power of the German military machirte. That is when they placed their lives at the disposal of their country. What about other lauds? They kne'v what they were encountering, that they were Ughting an oi,ganisatii-i, which had been perfected for .generations by the b&t brains of Prussia —perfected with one pmposp, the subjuga- tion of Europe—and yet they faced it." Our men did not know the accumulated and concentrated power" cf the German machine then, or for a long time afterwards. And nobody w&s permitted then to know that the Germans had won any victories. And "other lands" knew also that tney were pitting against the German-ma-chine their own machine, of which it was as true to say that they also had been perfectinc; it for generations with their best brains. France armed herself to the teeth from 1870 onwards to n.ght Germa.ny. if the need arose We do not see the object of again repeating this stale and exploded argument that the "unpreparodnesa" of the Allies was a sis'n of virtue. A comparison between the num- ber of men and ships maintained by the Allies in 1915, and by the Germans, and the respective naval and military expendi- ture, is sufEcient to shatter this fallacious reasoning. The question for the world is what diplomacy is to do in the future to arrest the recurrence of the present horrors? The All.ied programme -should g-a -very far towards achieving that. It promises a crushing defeat of the enemy a-ud expe- riences vdiich will sicken him of conquest— a.s other, and more warlike, peoples b n been sickened of wa.r by a expe- rience themselves of invasion and disaster. It promises a great weakening of their strength, regarded collect.! vfly though, 'n the other hand. if the Allied programme is carried qut in the spirit i. it. is intruded to be in the letter, there should be a corres- ponding curtailment of the power of any Allied nation that may in the future be seized with the s-Mne aggressive spirit as the Germane. Added to that. there wilt be the war- weariness of Europe, it's exhaustion, its! drain of Mood. its occupation with the tasks of reconstruction and convalescence, which a1mo:t "a1'e future peace in our time. Bcvond that we cannot look; th' future Europe Ttu,;t keep its own peace, and sta,nd or fa'l by its o'wn sound judgment or error. It is huTr'Milv impossible to predict the ab- r'olute extinction of war as a mode of settle- ment of internationnl disputes. If German aims could not be achM'ved without bleed- ?-,4bed the same is true of very many of th? Allied fims. We do not. venture to .predict wh,T.t combinations will be refcrmfd ;iJ the future, what revulsions, new friendships, what forgetfulness of fid antipathies there will bp. In our own time we h,ve seen grotesque changes we hav? teen armies now h,iiled a.s deliverers in the countries where not' so very many yea.rs a.go no lie was too j foul to be printed of their foiduct and char- acter. We have had a 'British Premier ac- cusine: hi< countrymen ot making war by "methods of bnrbarism"and that ia the phr25e tb f. p,ftpr a!sums up the German d'eeds. But whether the future be one of renewed war or of pea<ce we do feel assured that the new Europe, aa fashioned by the Allies, as far as it is in their power, will be freer, ha-ppier. th? hotter for all the terrific ordeal of tihe present. The dead i7eri.,tli, but the good work that they hav- wrought will, in this CMC. promise to live longer Mia,n the pvH done, in the (A:ie of i'he enemy. <- !————1 ————— )

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