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W <? would foUow the course of the war with twice the e!))ightenment if we we.-e as well acquainted wtth the Allied numbers as with the enemy s. We-h.ive frc-m time to time cmciai of the -ii ibzit'oli tnd numbers of Lhe va-ricus etfeTLlY foreM:n j different zone?—126 German division: in the We.3i. in mid-December 65 on the 1{11s¡.nan fron' 12 against the Rumanians, fit' But ]t0 such correspoi,dillg statements are pub_ lished in regard to the Allied troops, and t)o reproduction is made oven of enemy cal- culations of the respective similar strength .uid distribution o.f the Allied' troops, except in the solitary instance or the Macedonian armv, concerning whom a German estimate printed in the Allied Press. A iittle information upon the point would disrate many illusijns and enable a rounder judgment to b.e fuiined. But it 1 Hat to be obtained, and in default we have to J'l;cnd upon certain rough outlines which :<re cccasion.a.lly furnished by competent ..utr.orities. Such au autliority is Colonel Jcplngton of the who appears t(j oo-'upy a sem: omciai position for cn- 3"glitenitig.the British public to as great a. decree as i omcially deemed desirable. Writing upon t.he question of numbers in the West. he observes that—"The truth of t.be situation is that Germany has 128 divisionf. opposed to us, and that the number of French. British, and Belgian di- visions. <;ven aft<'r ta.kin.g into account the varying strengths of divisions on the two fddes, is-not yet such as to promise a deci- sion in offensive war. Before the war we supposed that a two, or even three to one superiority was not too great for an Stacker, and it must be repeated again and a.Kain that we have nothing like this su,peri- crity, and that victory depends upon obtain- ing it. It is always possible for the Germans to place in the West the noating balance of Ktra.tegic reserves which they useda-gamst Ru- mania, and if, in the year 1917, we only em- ploy against the enemy a slight Fupei-iority of force, nothing better than slight success <:an reasonably bp anticipa.ted. Over and over again in this war the Nelsonian maxim that numbers alone annihilate has been t-hown to be correct, and consequently our primary aim now iiiiis", be to provide these numbers, both of men a.nd gun?." He declarer we need fixty more divisdons, hÜ,h we can <)bt;tin by withdrawing from *h& Jess important zones the armies no- Jkppt uselessly there by copying the Gcr- 7-man method of reducing the number of ha-ttaiions to .1 division atMt fci-mii'-g new divisions h'om the balance thus undered j ? ? ?n. bic, Rnd by r.iisin'g uew divisMns, a .ç:r.?.'<¡' lc, 'n\. y ril¡"nJ Hew 1 'lS1ons a P??a? ?pparentiy dtropped some consider- ibte tim& 3g'&: ?-e?v? ?mpto 4!?? ?oc-'?? i purpose, he say.s but Lord 'K.itc'heucr's plart has not been carried out. The ill\le- I <'ision of the late Government ha.a ma.n'e'j cur efforts in regird to the supply of men for the Army and the unsettled policy pur- sued in regard to the disposal of our man- power between the various spheres of activity. Colonel Repingt'n reminds ns that wlutst cur military en'oft on land has not yet given us a decision, through inadequacy. the aggregate totals of our men abroad do hot at all correspond to the very different total of actual lighters, the bayonets, and culig. And this always has been a weak point with Brittsh armies, that the Hghters nre m'uch. fe'wcr than they should be in proportion to the auxiliary workers. In the Napoleonic War we had -ibout 600,000 men under arm. but ellington never had one-twelfth of them under .command. We have, in short, a superiority upon the We&t, but not a decisive one, and ;not even a large one, in the opinion of Colonel Repington; on the other hand. the quality is from all points of 7iew better, and the equipment superior. Numbers are far from being the only thing that counts, but thev lie at the root of suc- cess, s.nd the grater the Allied superiority in numbers on the decisive front the greater the prospect of a victory in 1917 being a r&allv decisive one. so crushing the enemy's armies that they will be incapable of a re- newed stand upon the fortified lines far in the rear of their present ones. Britain must do more, beca.use she alone is capable of nnd- 3ng the men, money and equipment to- gether ItKly lacks the money, Russia the equipment. France the men. The French can justly expect us to take over the de- cisive role in the West In what we all hope are to be the closing stages of the war. Thev have thrown all their card s upon tho table, hllve bppn harder hit th:m thev cate to admit, officially, and nftpr aH it is against, France, and Franc? alone, that the real "wa,r of attrition" is waged—France, with her waning population, smaller than that of her .pattern rival, and her stagnant birth-rate. All the rhetoric in the world will not dispose of the hard. brutal fact that the blow to French vitality in this wir nay be g-rave. A nation needs numbers if it Is to keep Its place and French numbers were becoming more and more inade- quate to the ta-Ic of keeping France in her role of nrst class Power. By dint of milit.n'y efforts of unique proportions some of the con- sequences of the falling birth-rate were minim'?pd. but only ten1¡L'orarilv- Ger- many, through her own numbers, has proved equal to keepiiin; one hand whilst with the other defying for two years all f.h.. efforts of the French, even aided by increasingly p-owerfT)! British F- sistince, to m:ikG the Carman armies br.dge more than a mile or two hpr- and thpte from the positions taken up after the battle of the Marne. And the Germans must be driven out they hold t.he initiat.ive. fo" tnevf"l'cc th? hard&r of the two To1e" upon flip Allies —the offensive, against most powerfully de- fended positions. I

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