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Tbe Suvla' Bay despatch of Sir lan Hamilton is a document of thrilling and dramatic interest, wliich describes, perhaps, the greatest military tragedy in our annals. It is a story of the climax of an enterprise, in itself of almost insuperable difficulty, whoso arduousness was enhanced by the m iser Jculation and indecision that was exhibited from first to last by the responsi- ble authorities at homo, and which failed ultimately because that indecision was re- flected in thiree of the generals til),on the —General Stop ford, in general com- itiand ot tlw SnYla Bay sector, one of his divisional commanders, and that appears to have been communicated to Sil" Van points out with pertinence: It seems to us that Sir Ian Hamilton cannot escape some share of the criticism he quite rightly applies to others. His own version of what happened is sufficiently extraordinary. He went to Suvla Bay oil the afternoon of August 8, a.nd found that nothing was being done. A furuber attack had been planned for next morning. He want-ed an attack at once, and was met by excuses. He admits that, had the 11th Division sta.rt.ed out to attack a.t 10 p.m. that night, or even at 4 I.M. next' morning, the coveted heights might have been won, and the aspect of the operations possibly changed. The inexplic- a.hlp thing is that, although he points out what, the Corps a.nd Divisional commanders ought to have do He, be made no succe^ful attempt to compel them to act. He tells us that he urged various unanswerable con- siderations. and pointed out that the men Avere rested, fed. and watered but with aigument he stopped, and nothing effectual wa.s begun." Tlli one fatal moment excepted. Sir lan Hamilton and his staff, and the other com- manders, a,ppea,r to have done all that could have been done in the circumstances that prevailed, and they were nevertheless within an ace of victory. They had to labour under a weighty, almost cm siting, handicap. The country wa-s immensely difficult. It was unknown, and columns frequently lost their way. Their troops were inadequate in num- bers, and many of them inexperienced and unacolima-ti sed ■erani}>ed by a protracted voyage on shipboard, easy prey to the indescribable thirst of this waterless and burning land of hare parched diffs and dry I scrub. Their a.mmmution supply and their I artillery were far from what was needed, '['he enemy wa.s more numerous, dogged. and skilfully led. There was uo provision to fill up promptly the! itiioii of battle* in which but- bl otted out—one heroic! New ATmv Division, the 13th, JŒt 6.000 men ol I t ofI Yet, MYe fo) that one fa,t.a moment of in'pso)uHon, which found but flesh and blood where blood and iron were den?nd?d, a Hind en burg an ruthless 1'e80-\1 lution, anccM-s wou?d probabiy have been achieved, for oth?erwi?e the leading was brilliant, the vital naval work of transpor- tation and disembarkation masterly, and the fighting of the. men superlatively heroic, j though plainly unequal in certain cases. Long after ttit, and political j consequences of the failure at the Dardan-1 elies have exhausted themselves, generations1 to come will read With honour a nd reverence for the valour of the dead the epic inci- dents of this mighty -ti-iiggle. Pridt) rf place ■we will be proud to give to the shining glory that was won by the men from A. I' tmlia and New Zealand, whose people have accepted the bitter knowledge of the sterility of such gallantry with a dignity arid resignation that a Y,t- memorable ;i ii(i pra iseworthy. Yet these men were veterans before the ci'inax of their exertions in August at Sari Bair, and they would themselves be the most unstinted in their recognition of the deeds of the Tenitorials and the New Army men who were their comrades. For the ordeal of the latter was even greater they were unaccustomed to the torturing, prostrating thirst, the scorch-1 ing sun, and they were thrown fresh from "cool, well-watered England" into the fur- nace of Q-ie. of the hottest clashes of arms of the war. Amonjgst these men vvere the 53rd W elsh Territorial .Divisaou. This embraces the 4th West Wales) and 5th (Rhondda) Territorial battalions of the Welsh Regiment, but. in- cludes a number of English Territorial bat- talions, of which one (the Herefordshire) is singled out for special praise. The division failed in its grand attack of August 10th, but Sir Ian Hamilton justly lays, stress upon the special hardships of the men, the nature (if their own inexperience, the lack of regulars or old hands to set an ex- ample. the "great gallantry" of many h-at- talionis, and tho devotion, with which their officers led. The first raisvxl service bat- talion of the South Wales Borderers, the 4th, was "worthy of such a leader as their colonel, Gillespie- "a very fine man," who led the vanguard of his column. The 8th Welsh Pioneers, tbe first New ArmJ; bat talion of the W elsh, was in the thick of it at Chanuk Bair, the key-position of the whole series of battles, and race d Maoris, New Zea-landers, and Gloucesters up the steep. The two elsh New Army battalions did conspicuously well. Surveying the story as a whole, one is amazed bv many features, not the 1"-06t of which is our own complete ignorance of the true military position throughout 1915. We taliked of German offensives foredoomed to failure for Itfgk ot men: it was our own offensive that mhguished for lack of men. Sir Ian wanted 50,000 rifles more, and they were nd--could not—be sent. W o talked of the attrition that would incapacitate the Germans from repairing their Avastage; it was our own inability to repair wastage that led to our units in Gallipoli thimLillg away to skeletons—Sir lam wanted 45,000 men merely to replace Avastage, and they were not sent. W e talked oi the Turks running shoTt of munitions; it was the British who were short of tmirnuiiitkwr, "the Turks had plenty." There is a curious and disturbing passage in ror lan's dispatch, in which he aNudeb to the Turks' knowledge of the German vic- tories in Poland before the British comman- der himself bad learned of them. It if strange that he should have been in ignor- aiieo of event-s of the first importance in the other theatres of wax. The optimism of the troops—a blind, overflowing optimism—too, bore no relation to the facts. And Sir Ian Hamilton's own hopes, based on the reported deterioration ot* the quality ot the Turkish drafts, ere signally discom- fited. He admits frankly that he was con- sistently disappointed. Tho conduct of the enterprise, from home ? however, the most material point that invites reflection • and there is written all over it tho damning dilatoriness of Wait and see." indecision. irresolution, and the belated acceptance of inevitable conclusions after the men had in the meantime been subject to measureless suffering and tens of thousands had been incapacitated in a pJAce that appears to have been little short of a pest house. Galdipoli is a typical Britisli military faill-im--a record of valour so surpassing that it almost redeemed defects of brain and will that doomed it to disaster.

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