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POLITICAL NOTES. 00 By F. W. JOWETT. PAGE 2.

LABOUR AND PEACE. Huge Majority in Favour of Stockholm. ¡ Conference to be Consultative only. I Lively Scenes. Il\1r. Henderson on Political Situation in Russia. ? y, an overwlielii-)in,, majority Friday's mo- I  an overwhelming majority Friday's mo- 8 Con^e fence of the British Labour Party ulder], ??? delegates to the Internaticoal i the hs't. Conference at Stockholm next month, ?ting ?a?; I 11 favour of Stockholm 1,846,000 galnst 550,000 TIL Majority in favour 1,296,000 'I ?r Ct4c'sioll was received with great cheering. a.rt Purdy, Chairman of the Labour ?? 0??? ??????' presided at the conference qo"din's "??'? were held at th<? Central 411? ????ster, and the six hundred dele- i++fndmg included four Russian deputies, 'w. lact been vls!tmg; the Allied countries. Mr. • A d i ™an) Premier of New South Wales, ? a?? ongst those on the platform. T, SPEECHES. "bi ^xecutive Committee presented a report I ,Nhi,?h stated that immediately upon the return I I 'foin USSla of Mr. Henderson with four Rus- (lp]^tes consu-Itat' Rs were arranged, amt j '^7as r*a abundantly c?a-r OY the Russian t that the proposed international con- ?Qcp ? Stockholm would be held, whether the ?tish Party decided to be represented or not, ? y there w(re important reasons for its '?8' o Pnv^ned without delay. The Executive ???aci 'bp? ? ? ???cs to two to recommen d to the 'Ollference that the invitation should be wee.0 Pted, ?nditionallv on the gathering being ? tbp "ture of a consultation, and that no '?iDo- '?lution should be adopted. ^ealr, Paris deputmionthe report /bde- ?" ? ??th the Paris deputation the report 'Aid-. Cl()Ilsllltati<),Is took pl<?e ? [he Russian imitation !X1 ?? result that a sene& 01 reso- rpcr ai,^jng the procedure of the confer- le ;Vas r?GC' .;d upon, and the recommendation C?? hat It should be postponed until Septem- Q TJ. D. t asals,() decided that the International Il Onference with the British section of the ► JiaH Socialist Bureau should be post- .'Illtil August 28 and 29." ???ges have been endorsed by the '?tish section of the party executive, and the ?%t pollel,n,e,lt of ?? International Conference 44 emeat International Conference ?b?e???? ?epted by the organising bureau of fcferencG- In all these circumstancea, ryev k °^eve /3 ^een considered advisable for the ^en ?t?el't 8Peci4i Conference to be held as origin- ? ??n.. ??- The decis? of the eleates al • ° OWlHS resolutions are now invited: i ^1° invitation to the International ^Hfp-t prinal c^kholm ? accepd on oon- ^ion that the Conference be consultative, ? ?anStorv ???'?c-e be consultative, 1\ (2)hat th ?legatMii consist of 24 repre- tatIv.es, the Exocu'bive Committee to ap- I>oii1+ 61? Parliamentary Committee of the T,5 ? Lmons Congress be invited to a "It ci,ht and the present special confer- ?PP??? eight, this sectional represen- ^ticm ? equally reduced should circum- ???Reces.sitate. (3) this conference stand adjourned l'til Tues y, August 21, at 10.30 a.m., that T^^eeutlVe Committee's report and the aft I'llemoi-anduni on war issues be circulated to part societies that amendments be re- °S%eod i ,m till Friday August 17 and that the «tell.1 d b. +n kcr, .aliduni and amendments be the su b jects of ISCUSSlOn at the adjourned conference. V THE CHAIRMAN. I ?re"?? ? the Labour party at its Neren had agreed bv large majorities to ?''y r.? t? War until v?torv rested with the ? ? .? territor i es were freed, 44d IN I until the Evaded terntones were heed, e^ and f" ?P?tlon was made for and crimes on land and sea. P?  ?? ^Vas the resolve of the great K/WI-^Y reso l ve of the great ka 4 ,Ss of' the ?dustnal masses in this counuy ? the 4k the r,r omes* -^0 peace would be satisfactory Sl> this, blood ,vl,ic h did not en- fKK^ which did not en- &g;'eelnplete freedom from the nightmare of I\d whif.??"??''?" so long held over them, k4d C l I d not secure the right of small b.ei; R d es wou l d nee d all the th^atln+i lat the Laboui- party could give ta Tl lGre was no question of a separate {h?- '!1l| ??? ??"cl s h ou l der to shou l der lltil ? fhey mnt stand shoulder to shoulder rIV'itati'lghteC?us peace had been obtained. The ?T ???on S? ?y ??? ?'?? called to con- I deserved h most ser i ous cons 'd )h was -their most serious (?onsi deration.   Ided on a vote that as the state- had be er' "lad,? on hehalf of the Executive Mr. Hendf»-S°n ??" sections should imme- ,.?ely ad ionv;n LS0 that they wou ld be able to r\¡¡:e Part in th So that they wou ,}e ao 0 httt COlU f e ehate after having decided ? ?t coui?e ()f actIon they would take. t L "I'- IIENDF-RSO-N EXPLAINS. I T X I- Sharing Trft)?01' said that he addressed that ll'lng: lVI th a i doop sense of his personal re- ?sibility a?nr)? ??? to make a fair and ?? ?atemt ? Position. He asked the lifeto be ai, Posit ion. He asked the hit 11 'It?101-1 m  i n d tliat the politi(,?al Qlat:on In Russia iF! .and had been constatl th "gin Ir Tnles, dm?y ?lembered that, ius- ti et, could not b- done 'either to the menÜ; of 1:\ case ? to hi: o??'???on?al ao ction. tl) (!want to say quite free1v that before I went ??1???10'??????? that before I went tl:\il1S¡;;i 10 or 12 weeksa.go I opposed to holdi 0 f an ordina'y International confer- Oe. my ,arrival in PetrogI°ad I met the i ecutIV'e of the Workmen's and SQldiers" Coun- oil, and though in Russia, as I distinctly told them, on a Government mission, I said I was going to speak to them as the secretary of the Labour movement. "I put before them what I conceived to be the attitude of organised labour on the war. I gave the decision of the Manchester conference against holding the International Conference in tke form then declared. The question of their proposed conference, for which invitations had already been issued was discussed. "I pointed out how impossible it would be for the British Labour Party to ascept the invita- tion on the conditions laid down and under no condition -until the Manchester decision had been reversed. When I was presented with the state- ment of the Executive of the- Workmen's and Soldiers' Council and the invitations they had already issued, it appeared to me that there were three courses open — First, definitely to decide on the rejection of the whole matter. I have no hesitation in say- ing that having regard to the oondition of pub- lic opinion in Russia at the moment that would have. been about the most fatal position I could have taken up either in a Government capacity or as a representative of the great British La- bour movement. "The second course open was to have informed them that I would be prepared to come at the earliest opportunity and advise the Labour party to revürse its decision and to accept the. proposal for a. conference on the conditions. I made it unmistakably plain that I could do no such thing, and I hope before I sit down to give you the reasons why. "The third course opeii to me was to inti- mate to them that if ■■yerf prepared to change completely the conditions of their con- ference, turning it from an obligatory confer- ence to a consultation for the purpose of ex- changing views, I would recommend the Labour movement to so reverse its decision as to make such a consultation poisible." Let me emphasise the fact that the Russians had it in their minds that they wanted a bind- ing conference for the purpose of discussing the actual terms of peace. British Labour, I stated, could only attend the conference, if they attend- ed one at all, where their representatives would make a full and frank statement as to why they had supported the war, as to what were the aims and objects that they still continued to support the war in the hope of achieving. I made it as plain as I was capable of doing that if the conference was held, in which we participated, there could be no question of ne- gotiating peace terms. I pointed out that the Socialists in England and other countries .were not yet the nation, and that the only people who were responsible for negotiating actual peace terms were the Governments of the re- spective countries, for upon them rested, on be- half of the people, the entire responsibility. I also pointed out that there could be no bind- ing decision of any kind, that it was absolutely impossible for us to contemplate entering a con- ference where the conditions should 'be made mandatory and binding. I said that the confer- ence could be no more than an opportunity for exchanging views. In order that this might be effectively carried out I said that it was abso- lutely necessary that representatives of the Al- lied countries should be- present, including the United States of America. Now, I am asked -why I did not immediately reject the idea of British representatives attend- ing such a conference. The reason is simply that in my opinion our easeyhas never been properly stated, and is certainly not properly understood to this day in Russia. To refuse point-blank to consider the question would have done incalcul- able harm. Our objects had been perverted, and these perversions had been utilised to the full by enemy agents. (Hear, hear.) It seemed to me that the proposed conference under the con- ditions laid clown, if approved by you, would afford a useful opportunity for a statement of our case, always providing that satisfactory con- ditions are laid down for the attendance of our best representatives. It was no exaggeration to say, he went on, that the conditions in Russia at that time were positively appalling, and it was difficult to say whether they had improved at the moment. He was pressed to use all the influence he had with British Labour to secure the attendance of re- presentatives, and unless he was prepared to shut his eyes to the facts of the situation he had no alternative but to recommend that British representatives should attend, provided satisfac- tory conditions were first laid down and accepted by the promoters of the conference. So much for the position as it was when he was in Russia. It would be a mistake to try and persuade themselves that there had been no change. There had been a tremendous change. (Hear, hear.) The Provisional Government then in,power was no longer in office. They had been replaced by an almost entirely new Coalition, under the leadership of that brave soul Kerensky. (Cheers.) He agreed that there was now some modification of the new position as compared with the old one, perhaps, even the question of the conference. He did not know the reasons why the American Federation of Labour had decided not to attend such a con fer- ence, and the Belgian and French Socialists were prepared to attend, provided satisfactory oondi- tions were laid down. Both these two parties took up a position en- tirely opposed to his own. They wambed con- ditions which were absolutely binding. He and his colleagues had always laid it down that they were opposed to anything in the nature oT a binding conference. The Russian programme made such a conference impossible. Russians still maintained that the conference should be a binding conference. They were opposed. To send delegates to a binding conference would be to place British Labour in a most dan- gerous position, as whatever resolutions were carried they would be binding upon all who were represented. Both in Petrograd and Paris he strongly opposed the ideas of the Russian pro- gramme, and strongly insisted on no departure from the conditions he had laid down. Stating his own conclusions on the matter, he said that notwithstanding all the opposition to the idea of a conference, he was convinced that, under proper safeguards, a consultation such as he had suggested would have been productive of much good. Surely a, frank statement of their case, presented by working class represen- tatives, would have assisted in dispelling all mists from the minds of Socialists in Russia and neutral countries, and would probably have pro-' vided the German Minority Socialists with im- portant new facts which had been purposely withheld from the German people. He hoped the delegates would dismiss from their minds the suggestion that any of them had been in- fluenced by either unworthy or unpatriotic mo- tives. (Cheers.) In his opinion our case and the case of the Allies was so strong that if it were presented by responsible working class representatives it would materially assist in convincing the Ger- man people that it was the crime of their rulers that caused the war, and that it was the crime of their rulers that now prevented its just set- tlement. He had not wavered in the slightest degree in his attitude towards the war, nor had he changed his mind as to the need of a final complete settlement. But he wa.nted to say that in a war in which losses of such terrible magnitude were being imposed upon all the na- tions, it was not only wise but imperative that every country should use its political weapons to supplement its military organisation if by so doing it could defeat the enemy. (Cheers.) Having stated his case he left the decision to the conference, but he appealed to them to re- member poor Russia, whose miracle was wel-, comed a short time ago as the finest thing that had been done during the whole of the war. (Hear, hear.) Of this I am convinced," said Mr. Henderson in conclusion. If we to-day, representing as we are, the great British Labour and Socialist movement, determine that for the Wiiole period of the war we árt. political weapon to supplement our military acti- vities, not only shall I regret it, but I will ven- ture to predict that you as a movement will re- gret it hereafter. (Hear, hear.) Let us by all means at our disposal, wletliei- they be military or political, strive to secure such a victory as will ensure for the world a lasting, honourable, and democratic neace." (Cheers.) Answering questions, Mr. Henderson said that if the proposed conference was held on the linlim of the Old International this country would be entitled to send 120 delegates, but in view of transport difficulties--(IaugbteT,I-it was suggested to limit the number of delegates from this country to 24-that was, eight from that conference, eight nominated by the Executive, and eight from the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Unions Congress. The Conference then adjourned for luncheon. MINERS' VOTE. I As the result of a private conference of miners' delegates held during the adjournment, the delegates, by a majority of 541 votes to 184, decided to support the resolution for a consulta- tive conference at Stockholm. THE RESOLUTION. I On the resumption of the conference, Mr. W. C. Robinson (Textile Workers) moved the prin- cipal resolution That the invitation to the International Conference at Stockholm be ac- cepted on condition that the conference be con- sultative and not mandatory." He emphasised the fact that the conference would not in any way bind the Allies to any terms of peace that might be agreed to by the conference. Labour must insist upon a peace that would give complete independence to the small nationalities of Europe. They must have security for the future, and people must live their own lives in peace under their own. Gov- ernments. There could be no peace until we have persuaded the peoples of the world to break with militarism in order that they might live their democratic lives. Mr. W. Carter (Nottingham Miners) seconded, because he was in favour, he said, of Interna- tionalism, and because he believed in a League of Nations. I MR. SEXTON'S AMENDMENT. An amendment was immediately tabulated by Mr. J. Sexton (Dockers' Union),- That this conference, having heard the statement of Mr. A. Henderson, while agree- ing that he was actuated by a sincere desire to serve the best interests of the British de- mocracy, is of the opinion that no case has been made out for the appointment of dele- gates to Stockholm or any other conference which would include delegates from enemy countries, and that this conference do now adjourn sine die." Mr. Sexton said there were times when loyalty to an executive meant treason to the rank and file. He maintained that the resolution meant such treason. The resolution was not based on the invitation sent from Russia. His great ob- jection was that our delegates would be meeting- men who had not yet repudiated the crimes and brutality of their German masters and rulers, whose hands were still red with the blood of Cap- tain Fryatf, Miss C'avell, and the men on the Belgian Prince the other day. (Cheers.) There was only one way of ending this war, much as. he was opposed to war, and that was by laying down the terms of the Labour world: that we intended by the strength of our own right arm to save our own kingdom from being crucified by one of the most terrible enemies that l England or any other country in the world ever had. (Cheers.) < «' NOT A CAPITALIST WAR." Mr. G. N. Barnes, M.P., the Pensions Min- ister, in seconding the amendment said he was opposed to the resolution, thougn lie agreed that if the proposition should succeed in shortening the war by only one single hour, the resolution would have been justified.. He didn't believe it would. He asked them to remember that no sec- tion of the Conference had a monopoly of the desire to shorten the war, and to avoid subsi- diary issues, such as the statement that the war was being carried on for the benefit of the capi- talist. The war had nothing to do with tIN capitalist system—( cries of "Oh! "What about profiteering? and derisive laughter)—ex- cept that if we lost the war we were not likely to get rid of the capitalist system for a genera- tion or more, while if we won the war, then we should have prepared the ground for more speedily getting rid of the capitalist system. (Hear, hear). We entered this war to obtain certain ideals and hs was convinced that the pro- posed Conference would only defeat those aims. America, Belgium, France, and Italy would not be represented at the Conference. (Cries of "How do you know?") What he was talking about had been publicly announced. Therefore when the British delegates got to Stockholm they would be there to discuss with the Germans on the one hand and the Russians on the other, with the Scandin-avians as a make-weight or make-believe, the terms of peace on any terms. (" No," and hear, hear.) Were they going to Stockholm to discuss the terms of peace? ("No, no.") It was for them all to say in, perhaps, the most tragic moment of their history whether this was the best time to discuss the terms of peace. ("No" and Yes.") For his part he did not think it was the right time. (Hear, hear. ) If they discussed terms of peace now., they would be the terms of peace mentioned in the resolution. The conference might be called 'for consulta- tive purposes, but, willy-nilly, they would be drawn into a discussion on no indemnities and no annexations." Now the war could only be settled according to the relative strength of par- ties at the end of it, and' if we ended the war now the Germans would decide what was meant by the words no indemnities and no annexa- tions." He for one declined to be led away by any such phrasemongering. KERENSKY'S VIEW." I Mr. Ramsay Macdonald said he wished to intervene in the discussion. Mr. Henderson had been suffering for the past week what he had been suffering for the past three years—-the grossest misrepresentation from certain sections of the press. Mr. Macdonald was proceeding to speak, when he was subjected to a lot of interruption, and the Chairman appealed for a hearing for Mr. Macdonald. Proceeding, Mr. Macdonald said that Keren- sky's view was that a Stockholm conference was absolutely necessary if his hands were to be strengthened in Russia. Russia to-day wanted their support. They wanted to show Russia that there was no Imperialism in the war, but that democracy was fighting from an international point of view. That was all Russia wanted. Was British Labour not going to do it ? There had been a conference of financiers in Switzerland, and no Government had refused passports for them and no Trade Union had re- fused to facilitate their passage. Let the past bury the past. I ask you to go to Stockholm— (Cries of "No" and Yes")—to consult and make your views known, to state your case, to hear the other side tell its case. and then come back with the basis of peace in your pockets. What we want, declared Mr. Macdonald, from the democracies of Europe is a clear statement of their aims, so that he who runs may read. (Che,ers.) j MR. ROBERTS' VIEW. I Mr. G. H. Roberts, M.P., said that through- out the war he considered that British Labour ought not to enter into a conference with enemy subjects during the war. He had healrd nothing that day to change his opinion. After hearing Mr. Henderson he had great difficulty in under- standing what the right hon. gentleman's posi- tion really was. (Laughter.) He (Mr. Roberts) felt like a man who had been taking a scenic photograph through a Scotch mist; (Loud laughter.) Proceeding, Mr. Roberts declared that such a Conference would be the greatest possible embarrassment to those who were strug- gling to bring order out of chaos in Russia at the present moment. What Kerensky needed most at the moment was to be left alone. (Hear, hear.) A Conference would play into the hand s of the enemies to law and order in Russia, and would bring Kerensky's Government down as they had brought down the previous Govern- ments. (Hear, hear.) Thus, Russia wanted to h3 left alone. (Hear, hear.) He declined to agree that those who mis- represented this country should be allowed to enter a conference with the enemy. The Ger- man hand was behind this proposed Conference. The great mass of the people of this country was against the proposal. There was no change in the heart of the German people. The Majority Socialists were still supporting the German Government and its aims. The. holding of such a Conference would be a gross betrayal of the. men who had laid down their lives for the free- dom of the people of this country. (Applause and cries of No ") A WARNING. I Mr. J. H. Thomas, M.P., said that with re- o-arcl to America's attitude towards the Confer- ence, they knew very little about it. It was strange that Gompers' telegram had not been sent to the Labour Party here. He also would like to know what had been actually conveyed to him before he sent the telegram. He was going to vote for the resolution, and he was as good a patriot as those who opposed it, and he would not allow his attitude to be altered in any way by reason of anything that Germany might say. Sooner or later we must meet the enemy to dis- cuss terms. (A Voice: "Not by a Stockholm loonference.") Mr. Thomas said it was up to the interrupter to suggest a better way. Proceeding, Mr. Thomas said if it were true that we were fighting not for plunder or territorial aggrandisement, then why should we not try to obtain our ends by all means in our power. If our soldiers and sailors were fighting in order that liberty might live, we should help them to obtain that which they were dving for. It might be that if the resolution was carried passports would be refused, but he warned those who took up such an attitude to remem- ber that the time would come when thev them- selves would be the first to suffer for their act. (Applause.) Labour had got to have a voice in peace, so that this war should be the end of all wars. (Applause.) I RESULT. On a card vote, Mr. Sexton's amendment was lost by 391,000 votes to 1,651,000. A card vote on the l1in resolution to accept I the invitation to attend on condition that the conference is consultative and not mandatory resulted in 1,846,000 for and 550,000 against. On the succeeding resolution that the dele- gates to Stockholm should number 24, to be selected in equal proportions by that special con- ference, the executive of the Labour Party, and the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress, an amendment was proposed by the Miners' Federation that no further addition be permitted to these numbers from any affiliated or unaffiliated body in this country. The amendment was passed, and on being put as a substantive motion, another amendment was submitted to adjourn the conference until August 21. Mr. Philip Snowden, M.P., pointed out that as the invitation to Stockholm came from the International Socialist Bureau, the Labour Party had no right to say whether other bodies should or should not be represented. After further argument, the amendment to adjourn the conference to August 21 was passed by a large majority.

Mr. Henderson's Resignation. CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE PR&MIER. On Saturday the Press Bureau announced that the Right Hon. Arthur lVIenderson a member of the Cabinet, had resigned office, and that the resignation had been accepted. Later the following correspondence between the Prime Minister and Mr. Henderson was sent out: — Offices of the War Cabinet, v 2, Whitehall Gardens, Angvr, 1917. Dear Prime Minister, At our interview last night I gathered you had reachedy-he conclusion that my retention of the position of Secretary to the Labour Party was no longer compatible with my membership of the War Cabinet. Recent experiences have impressed me with the embarrassing complica- tions arising from this duality of office. In these circumstances, therefore, I deem it advis- able to ask you to release me from further mem- bership of your Government. I continue to share your desire that the war should be carried to a successful conclusion, and trust that in a non-Government capacity I may be able to render some little assistance to this end.—I remain, yours sincerely, (Signed) ARTHUR HENDERSON. 11th August, 1917. My dear Henderson, I am in receipt of your letter of this morning tendering your resignation of your position as a member of the War Cabinet, and have received the permission of his Majesty, to whom I sub- mitted your resignation, to accept it. My col- leagues and I have received with satisfaction the assurance of your unabated desire to assist in the prosecution of the war to a successful con- clusion, and they greatly regret that you can n,o longer be directly and officially associated with them in that enterprise. There are, how- ever, certain facts with which it is essential that the public should be acquainted in order thac they may form a correct appreciation of the events that have led to this regrettable conclu- sion. The first is that your colleagues were taken completely by surprise, by the attitude which you adopted at the Labour Conference yester- day afternoon. You knew that they were in the present circumstances unanimously opposed to the Stockholm Conference, and you had your- self been prepared to agree to an announcement, to that effect some days ago. At your sugges- tion, however, and that of your Labour col- leagues, it was decided to defer any such an- nouncement until after the meeting yesterday. I was under the impression, after several talks with you, that you meant to use your influence against meeting enemy representatives at Stock- holm. What has happened in Russia during the last few weeks has materially affected the position in reference to that Conference. You admitted to me that the situation had completely changed even within the last fortnight, and that what- ever ground you might have thought there was for delegates from Allied countries attending such a Conference a fortnight ago, the events of the last few days had shown you the unwis- dom of such a course. That was clearly what you led me to believe; it was therefore with no small surprise that I received a letter from you yesterday afternoon stating that you ought to inform, me that, after the most careful considera- tion, you had come to the conclusion you could take no other course than to stand by the ad- vice you had given the day after your return from "Russia," and that your colleagues subse- quently read the speech which you had delivered. Surely this was a conclusion of which you ought to have informed the Cabinet before you ei-ttered tlle Conference. When you spoke at that Conference you were not merely a member of the Labour Party, but a member of the Cabi- net, responsible for the conduct of the war. Nevertheless you did not deem it necessary to inform the Conference of the views of your col- (CONTINUED ON PAGE 3).