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J^retgn Entrliigcnrc.


J^retgn Entrliigcnrc. WE have copied, for the information of our readers, a document which has been looked for, in the political world, with a good deal of anxiety, ever since the publication of the Treaty of London, of the 15th of July, on the Eastern question. This Document is called a Memorandum delivered by M. Guizot to Lord Palmerston, on the 24th of July, 1840. Peace is the avowed object of France according to this document. How, however, can we re- concile this profession, or rather the multiplied professions of peace, which we are continually finding in the writings and speeches of the French, with the preparations they are making, not only warlike per se, but directly implying the probability of a rupture ? We find, from the newspapers, that attaches to the British Embassy in Paris are not only expressing their fears as to the result of "the present crisis," but that they are also providing themselves with passports, in order that ther families may be in readiness to start for England at the shortest notice; while an English Consul at one of the sea ports on the north-western coast of France, has reported that he had received instructions from his Government to be pre- pared to take his departure "within ten days or a fortnight." The manifestation, throughout France, of the greatest activity in preparing for the contingency of war, strangely contrasts itself with the professed desire for undisturbed peace. At Toulouse, Strasbourg, and Douai, the cannon-foundries have been put into full operation; and at the several manufactories of arms the number of workmen have been dou- bled. The powder-factories belonging to the French Government, which are capable of sup- plying 2,000,000 kilogrammes of gunpowder per annum, are represented to be in a state of full activity, and the works for the fortification of Paris are reported as having proceeded with great expedition,—the King having given up, without compensation, not only the ground belonging to the Civil List, but also a portion of his own private property, in order to facili- tate, as much as in him lies, the progress of the fortification. The French Journals however generally, the Journal des Debats especially, appear to be actuated by an uncommonly vehement desire that we should understand that the fortification of Paris has not been resolved upon as a menace, but as "an ener- getic reply to the concealed menaces embraced in the quadruple treatyending a long article, composed chiefly of fudge and humbug, on the fact that the French having confided for ten years in the alliance of England will confide in it no more,—with the following piece of swagger "We are neither pusillani- mous, nor menacing: we are firm and resolved to run every risk rather than sacrifice the smallest particle of our rights, of our independ- ence, of our rank in the world." In order to a proper understanding of this beautiful bit of bluster, we would remind our readers that it is the composition of the admirers of M. Thiers, whose history is about as amusing as it is unaccountable, and whose conduct during a certain portion of that history, viz:—that of the commune of Paris and the massacres of September, has been compared, in by-gone days, to a child in a battle, either hiding him- self in a hole, counting the number of reports of cannon he hears, or else stopping his ears with his fingers, and shutting both his eyes, that his little heart may not go pit-a-pat once oftener than is absolutely necessary:—and then perhaps they will be inclined to read the passage thus, "resolved to run away" instead of "run every risk." Shades of Nelson and Abercrombie shelter us from these sanguinary Frenchmen! We proceed to give a transcript of the document we spoke of at the commencement of this article. "MEMORANDUM DELIVERED BY M. GUIZOT TO LORD PALMERSTON ON THE 24TH OF JULY, 1840." France, in the affair of the East, has always been desirous of acting in accord with Great Britain, Aus- tria, Prussia, and Russia. Her conduct has been in- fluenced only by the interests of peace. She has never judged the proposals made to her in any other point of view than that of the general interests, and never with a view to her own interests, for no Power is more disinterested in the Eastern question than she is. Judging in this manner, she has considered as ill-conceived all the proposals, the object of which was to tear from Mehemet Ali, by force of arms, those portions of the Turkish empire of which he is in occupation. France does not conceive that this will be for the good of the Sultan, because it would tend to give him that which he could neither govern nor keep. She does not think it good either for Turkey in general, or for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe in particular, because it would weaken, without giving any advantage to the Sovereign, a vassal who may give powerful assistance in the common defence of the empire. Nevertheless, this is a question of system on which there may be many diverging opinions. But France has particu- larly declared herself against any project the adoption of which might bring on the employment of force, because she could not distinctly see the means which the Five Powers could dispose of. These means ap- peared to her to be either insufficient or more injuri- ous than the state of things intended to be remedied. What she has thought on this subject she still thinks, and has reason to believe that this opinion is not ex- clusively hers. Under later circumstances no positive proposition has been addressed to her upon which she could explain herself. The determination communi- cated to her by England, no doubt in the name of the Four Powers, cannot, therefore, be imputed to refusals, which she never had an opportunity of making. But further, without insisting on the question to which it might give rise, France again declares that she consi- ders as inconsiderate, and not very prudent, a conduct which shall consist in coming to resolutions without the means of carrying them into execution, or with means of execution insufficient or dangerous. The insurrection of some of the people of Lebanon is no doubt an opportunity which it has been thought right to seize for finding means of execution which had not before been presented. Is this a means avowable, or above all so useful, that the Turkish empire ought to act upon it against the Viceroy ? it is desired to re- establish some little degree of order and obedience in all parts of the empire, and yet insurrections are fo- mented. New disorders are added to that general disorder, which all the Powers already deplore as con- trary to the interests of peace. Will they succeed in subjecting those people to the Porte, after exciting Hem to rise against the Viceroy ? These questions have certainly not been resolved. But if this insur- rection is repressed, if the Viceroy becomes again thf assured possessor of Syria, if he thereby becomes more irritated. more difficult to persuade, and he answers to their summons by a positive refusal, what are the means of the Four Powers ? Certainly, after having employed a whole year in seeking for them, they caimot have discovered them recently, and a new danger will have been created more serious then be- fore The Viceroy, excited by the means employed against him—the Viceroy, whom France has contri- buted to restrain, may pass the Taurus, and again threaten Constantinople. What will the Four Powers do in this case ? In what manner will they enter the empire in order to give succour to the Sultan ? France conceives that thereby there is prepared for the inde- pendence of the Ottoman empire, and for the general peace, a danger much more serious than that with which they were threatened from the ambition of the Viceroy. If all these eventualities, the consequence of the conduct about to be adopted, have not been provided for, the Four Powers will be engaged in an obscure aud perilous path if, on the contrary, they have been foreseen, and the means of meeting them agreed upon, then the Four Powers ought to make them known to Europe, and, above all, to France, who has always taken part in the common object—to France, whose moral concurrence they still claim —whose influence at Alexandria they invoke. The moral concurrence of France in one common con- duct was an obligation on her part, but it is no longer so in the new situation in which the Powers seem to wish to place themselves. France can henceforth be no longer directed but by what she owes to peace, and what she owes to herself. The line of conduct she will hold under the grave circumstances in which the Four Powers have placed Europe will depend on the solution which may be given to all the questions that have just been indicated. She will always keep in view peace, and the maintenance of the present ba- lance between the States of Europe. All her means shall be consecrated to this double object."

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