Hide Articles List

8 articles on this Page

in wi iw i I —MIIIIM.........asAAWI…






————————————————t HOUSE OF…


———————————————— t HOUSE OF COMMONS.—THURSDAY. THE TRUCK SYSTEM. { Mr. C. Forster moved for leave to bring in a bill to alter 1 and amend the act commonly called the Truck Act, which, J he observed, while it struck at collusive contracts, over- looked collusive payments. He gave an outline of the chief provisions of the bill, which was similar to that in- troduccd by Lord Palmcrston. 7 Lord Palmerston supported the motion, in conformity { with the pledge he gave when he withdrew the bill he in- I troduccd last session. He agreed that upon general prin- I ciples it was better to leave classes of men to arrange with each other; but, at the same time, cases would arise in which one party would be more or less dependent upon 1 another, and unable to take care of their own interests, and it was notorious that, before the Truck Act, there were great abuses. Upon principle, wages ought to be paid in money but there were many ways in which the law could be evaded. In supporting the motion, however, j he recommended that the bill should be referred to a select committee. After some further discussion, the motion was agreed to. FRIDAY. TURKEY AND RUSSIA. ON the motion for going into Committee of Supply on the Navy Estimates, Mr. Layard, who had given notice on the subject, called the attention of the house to the present state of the relations of England and Turkey. In an elaborate review of the policy adopted by the Government, founded on the blue-books, the hon. gentleman accused them of vacillation, and demanded that in future, more spirit and energy should be displayed in checking the advances of Russia. Sir James Graham defended the conduct of the Govern- ment, who, he contended, had only. sought to maintain peace by honourable means. The right hon. baronet mi- nutely narrated the chain of negociationsby which the al- liance with France had been cemented, and the neu- trality of Austria and Prussia secured. War was im- minent, and must be conducted with spirit. The quarrel was European, and the settlement must be European also. Government were prepared to do their duty, and appealed to the support of the House of Commons, which ought not to waste time in pottering over blue-books, when they were asked to add 20,000 men to the naval and military forces, and to augment the public expenditure by £2,000,000. If dissatisfaction was felt in any quarters at the conduct of the Government, he challenged hon. mem- bers to frame a distinct motion on the subject, and bring the question to a speedy issue. Viscount Jocelyn and Lord Dudley Stuart supported Mr Layard's views. Mr. Roebuck, in an eloquent speech, supported the Government, but wished them to indicate the course they now intended to adopt. I LORD JOHN RUSSELL'S WAR SPEECH. Lord John Russell: Sir, after the very generous and, I must say, the very wise speech of the hon. member for Sheffield, I can have no hesitation in rising to give the house that information which he so properly asks, in refer- ence to so grave a question. (Hear, hear.) However, with respect to my right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the statement which the hon. member supposes him to have made relative to our position, I think the hon. member has fallen into an error, because it was not my right hon. friend, but the hon. member for Aylesbury, who mistook our position. The events which have taken place seem to have hastened us towards war, and we ask you to assist us in our preparations for the same, but at present do not ask you to vote the estimates. There appears to me, at the period at which we have ar- rived, to be three courses which the house may adopt with propriety, according to its particwlar disposition or iuelina- tion. It may say, first—"War is impending, but you, her Majesty's present Ministers have committed so many errors that we cannot allow you any longer to have the conduct of affairs upon so momentous a question. The second course is to say—as I understood the hon. member for Sheffield to say—" There may be errors in the course you have pursued we think that at one point you should have acted with more deeision or that at another, you should have made more sure alliances but these arc questions of difficulty, upon which it is not easy to come to a decision we will waive considerations of this kind, and vote further estimates which. you ask for." The third course is to say, without entering into the question of the nego iations at all, We will look entirely forward we will give our confidence to the Government; but we will watch their proceedings, and if they enter upon war, we will see that it is carried on with all the vigour and judgment necessary to bring it to a successful conclusion." Any one of these three courses the house might take, and any one would be fitting for the occasion; but my hon. friend, the member for Aylesbury has taken a course which I must say, if not satisfactory to the Government, I think can hardly be sa- tisfactory to the house, because, after stating certain facts which, he maintains, prove the Government to be entirely in error, he says—" Although I have made out my case I will, in my magnanimity, excuse you; I will pardon you for all the errors you have committed, and giving you a lame and limping confidence, I will allow you to take the votes for the estimates." That course can hardly be deemed satisfactory. I gay, with my right hon. friend, let us know whether you censure us or give us, your full confidence. One of these courses we ask the! house to pursue. I am not arguing in favour of any particular course; but I say that any one of those I have refeired to it would benefit the House of Commons to adopt in this grave and arduous crisis. In speaking, as I am obliged to do, of the negotiations which have taken place, I wish to refer as little as possible to particular documents, and will endeavour to confine myself to a general outline of the course of these negotiations. My hon. friend the member for Aylesbury says, and says truly enough, that as long as it was a mere question between France and Russia res- specting the Holy Places, it did not ccncern our Govern- ment to ascertain who was right and who was wrong; but as soon as a menace of force was heard, and preparations began to be made for calling fleets and armies into requisi- tion, the matter became one of interest to the Government of Great Britain. But, if any censure is merited in refer- ence to this point, it ought to fall upon the Government of Lord Derby and the foreign administration of Lord Mal- mesbury rather than upon us. I cast no censure upon the late Government; but I say it was perfectly evident that when Lord Malmesbury was at the Foreign-office threats of force were used, and, indeed, that the 0 preparations of Russia were founded on the pretext that the ambassador of France had threatened to have recourse to force in order to compel the Sultan to agree to demands which Russia said were incompatible with engagements into which the Sultan had entered with her. I myself was informed by Lord Stratford do Redcliffe, in answer to a question I put to him, that M. Lavalette had declared that unless his requi- sitions were complied with, he would immediately send for the French fleet to enforce them. Whcn such threats were held out, it became a question whether the English ought to seek for an explanation from France. I am bound to say that the French Government met us in the fairest and handsomest manner. (Hear, hear.) It desisted from pretensions which it declared to be founded on treaties and injustice, but which, as they might bring into play opposite pretensions on the part of Russia, and thus endanger the peace of Europe, it voluntarily abandoned. (Hear, hear.) Such was the state of the case when Lord Aberdeen entered office. Lord Malmesbury had written a private letter to Lord Cowley, calling his serious attention to these circumstances. I took the same course. On the very day on which I accepted the seals of the Foreign- office I wrote to Lord Cowley, calling his serious attention to the subject. I felt that one of the first, if not the first thing to be done, was to induce France to desist from her pretensions, because, if France and Russia had gone to war on the question of the Holy Places, not only would the peace of Europe have been broken, but the independence of Turkey would have been at an end. Well, as I have al- ready said, the French Government behaved with the greatest fairness. They felt that their ambassador had ] gone further than was intended—that he had exceeded his < instructions and conducted himself in ft manner which was ■ oppressive and alarming to the Sultan—and accordingly ] they withdrew their ambassador, and abstained from in- ( sisting on their pretensions, and, in consequence, the ques- ( tion of the holy places was very soon settled in a way I which left no parly any ground of complaint. From that c: moment was gained this great advantage, that we acted r with France in the cause of Turkey. (Hear, hear.) Do j[ not let my hon. friend imagine that thia is a matter of no „ importance. Let me agaia state what had been and What vas the case when we entered office. It was this :— France had claims upon Turkey, in respect of a treaty nade in 1740 and, although she felt-as she does to the nesent hour—that those claims wcre founded on that reaty and in justice, we found it impossible to abet France n enforcing these claims, and therefore we felt it to be of he utmost importance, that the question of the holy places ihould be settled immediately, in order that England and France might act cordiallly together. 1 am bound to de- :1 arc—and I am ready to repeat it over and over again, hat for the settlement of this question we are greatly in- lebted to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who having a per- 'ectTfnowledge of the affairs of Turkey—having great in- lucnce with the Turkish Government and great power, the •esult of his eminent abilities, of enforcing his opinions, tided most materially in bringing about the desired result. Hear, hear.^I now come to consider the conduct of Rus- sia. The allegations which the Russian Government made .0 us—and made over and over again for several months— he allegations which it made to Sir C. Seymour—the al- egations which it made to Lord Clarendon—the allegations vhich it made to the noble lord at the head of the Go- vernment, were to this effect—namely, that the conces- sions made to France by the Sultan, were at variance with iolemn engagements between Russia and Turkey were at variance with the plighted word of the Sultan, and such is Russia could not allow to take effect. Russia, therefore, laid that she required things to be placed in statu quo, as hey existed a few years before, and to obtain security, hat the statu quo should not be again disturbed. 'During he whole of this time—during several months which ilapsed—Russia never at any time suggested or gave us 'cason to suppose that it was her object and intention to >ain anything in respect to the general protection of the jreek subjects in Turkey —she never said that she meant :0 require any further than security in respect to the ques- .ion of the Holy Places. (Cheers.) There were coneeal- nent and deception on the part of Russia towards the jovernment of this country; but, while we gave credit to he assurances of the Russian Government, we were not ilind to the possibility that it might be deceiving us. (A augh.) Under these circumstances I wrote a despatch to Colonel Rose —which my hon. friend quoted, for what jupose I cannot understand—charging him to give imme- liate intelligence to his Government, if Russia should ad- ranee towards the frontiers of Turkey, and informing him ihat when Lord Stratford de Redcliffe should arrive at Constantinople, he would be furnished with more stringent instructions as to the course he was to take in the event of ihe Russians menacing an invasion of Turkey. As regards Prince Menschikoff s mission, while it was pretended to be 1 mission having for its object the settlement of the ques- tion of the Holy Places, and while it was stated over and Dver again, both by Count Nesselrode at St. Petersburgh and Baron Brunow here, to be a conciliatory mission, it was, in fact, as afterwards appeared, a mission to endea- vour, by some means or other, to give Russia complete supremacy over Turkey, and to make Turkey, for the fu- ture, the vassal of Russia. (Hear.) When the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers say that it is not the policy of Russia to destroy the integrity of Turkey, I believe that declaration to be sincere to this extent—that the ob- ject of Russia has been not at present to force on the con- quest and partition of Turkey, but rather to delay that conquest and partition, and to endeavour in the present year to degrade Turkey still more than she has been before degraded by successive wars and treaties on the part of Russia, and it was hoped that by means of force, or of costly and lavish diplomacy, to obtain terms from the Sul- tan which would render him completely subject to Russia, so that, if at any time he should attempt to throw off his chains, his postrate and helpless condition would make the conquest of the country an easy task. (Hear, hear.) Such I believe to have been the policy of Russia; but when Prince Menschikoff endeavoured to carry that policy into effect, we had sent to the scene of his operations the per- son best qualified in Europe to meet such pretensions, and counteract such efforts. We had sent the nobleman to whom I have already alluded—Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Constantinople—(hear)—and, let me observe, that if we had meant to be subservient to Russia, and to compli- ment away the independence of Turkey, as my hon. friend seems to suppose—if we had intended to defer to what might ultimately be the will of Russia, we should not have sent to Constantinople a nobleman who was distinguished beyond all other men, for his attachment to the cause of the independence of Turkey; who had always given her the wisest counsels, and endeavoured to impart to her that internal strength which would enable her to rescue herself from the state of dependence on Russia to which foregone circumstances had reduced her. Well, sir, events took tho course which, from the character of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, might have been expected. Prince Menschikoff made one demand after another, always, as he states, soft- ening those demands, and making them less stringent, in order to obtain the acceptance of them by the Porte. But at last, without doing that which, I think, he was bound to do towards Turkey—without saying these arc the stipu- lations which we shall be glad to have from you, but we have no right to quarrel with you if you refuse thern- if you consider that they trench upon your independence; and we have no right to demand the concession of them— instead of that respect, which not only all men of other nations, but even, I believe, many Russians think it would have been more right to evince towards Turkey—Prince Menschikoff determined to break off his relations with the Porte, and go back to the Russian territory. But it has been said most strangely that when this took place—when the Emperor of Russia threatened to occupy the Princi- palities, no protest was made against it by the British Go- vernment. But, sir, not only was there a protest—not only was there a demand made for explanation in the very able despatch of my noble friend Lord Clarendon—but there was that which was of ten times the value—namely, that within a week, or rather within ten days at least from the day when Prince Menschikoff left Constantinople, there was an order to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to place at his disposal, for the purpose of coming up to tbe neighbour- hood of the Dardanelles, the British fleet, and there was an order to the British Admiralty, to send Admiral Dun- das to the neighbourhood of the Dardanells. Mv hon. friend the member for Aylesbury has talked in a part of his speech, as if there was a pretence made that this fleet was sent to protect British interests, and not to protect the Sultan, but the purposes for which the fleet was sent are very clearly set forth in the despatch of Lord Clarendon of the 31st of May — Nevertheless, the departure of Prince Menschikoff, followed by the entire Russian mission, is a fact in itself of such grave importance, the military preparations of Russia on the Turkish frontier, are upon a scale of such vast magnitude, and the danger which threatens the Porte may be so imminent, that it appears indispensable to take measures for tho protection of the Sultan, and to aid his Highness in repelling any attack that may be made upon his territory. I have accordingly to inform your Excel- lency that, by her Majesty s commands, the fleet now sta- tioned at Malta is placed at the disposal of your Excel- lency, and that orders will be sent to Admiral Dundas to conform to the requisitions he may receive from you, and to repair to such place aa you may direct in the event of your considering the presence of a British force absolutely es- sential to the safety of the Turkish empire." sential to the safety of the Turkish empire." Now, sir, could any written despatch have protested in more eloquent words, or with greater firmness and decision, than the transmission of such orders to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and to the British Admiralty ? I stated at tjje time, to the House, that thtf fleet was sent to the neigh- bourhood of the Dardanelles, in order to prove the interest which her Majesty's Government took in maintaining the integrity of the Turkish empire. It was therefore clear to Russia, as it was clear to all the world, that in case Russia persisted in her unjustifiable demands, and in en- forcing them by her armies, England, in conjunction with France, meant to oppose such pcrsistance, and to repel such force. (Hear, hcar.) I must add to thIs, wnen tuis took place, so far was the Russian Court from thinking that we were acting in complete blindness with regard to their designs, that they complained, in a circular transmitted through Europe, that we had made a threatening demon- stration by the movement of the fleets to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, thereby showing that they clearly under- stood, at least, that movement; and, though they had ap- plied most unjustifiably and most untruly the argument derived from it, they proved most undoubtedly, that they understood the intentions of the British Government. (Hear, hear.) The next question that arose, was, whether the entry of the Russian troops into the principalities should be considered as a cause of war, and acted upon as such by Turkey and her allies ? Well, sir, upon that ques- tion we can have no better authority, as I conceive, than the authority of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. We thought here, that if Turkey, unprepared, was at once to provoke hostilities with Russia, and to use her undoubted right to declare that the entry into the principalities was a cams belli-we thought, I say, that in that case, Turkey would be exposed to great danger. (Hear, hear.) We must not conceal from ourselves, all along with respect to this ar- gument, the relative condition of the two nations-the power and force of Russia, on the one hand, as it had been collected, organised, and disciplined for many years, about half-a-million of men kept constantly under arms, trained with the greatest skill and diligence and the position of Turkey on the other hand, as we all know it to be, weak in the state of her finances, in the composition of her armies, and in the disaffection which she might have to fear from the activity of Russian emissaries. Under these circumstances, therefore, we could not conceal from our- selves, that if Turkey, unprepared, were to rush into that war, it could not but be a very unequal contest. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe took the same view. Knowing the position of Turkey as she then was, he said that for two purposes—first of endeavouring to negotiate a peace, and in the second place, for the purpose of preparing her forces —it was advisable for Turkey not to declare war, upon the entry of the Russian forces into the principalities. Would it have been wise in us-only allies in the case, who were not exposed to the danger of Turkey—to advise her to ex- pose herself to those dangers, when her best friends thought it unadvisable ? Such, we conceived, was a sufficient dc- .•laration that, not immediately proclaiming that we would precipitate hostilities, we should warn Russia that war must immediately follow if she did not recede. It is easy to say, with regard to any part of these negotiations, that, ■f you had taken a different course—if you had told the Emperor of Russia that you would at once go to war if he >ccupied the principalities, he would have hesitated before loing so. Nothing is more easy than to say, that it you lad done so and so, such and such a sovereign would have lone so and so; but nobody has attempted to give any >roof that such would have been tbe case, or to show that he Emperor of Russia, in the position of his great power, should not have considered this such an affront that, he would at once have entered into war without further delay. Then came the negotiations after the entry into the prin- cipalites and hcie I must say a word with regard to that Vienna note, which my hon. friend the member for Avies- bury says everybody has admitted to be a mistake. I am not going to defend the phraseology of the Vienna note (hear), as my right hon. friend near me has said it was no note of ours but with respect to the spirit of that Vienna note, and the intention in which it was framed, I am quite ready to defend both. To take an illustration-if you have a friend of your own, of no very great means, about to enter on an expensive law-suit with a man of £.)0,000 or £100,000 a-year, I might very well say to him—I see your rights; you, very possibly, may be able to show that you r.ro right; but it is possible that while your opponent has the means of carrying on the contest, you may be ruined; and, therefore, I should advise you to make some concession of your absolute and strict rights, in order to come to some agreement. That was the spirit of the ad- vice of the Vienna note, and, for my part, I say, looking to the dangers to which Turkey was exposed, it was good and wise advice that she should consent to those terms which she was not absolutely obliged to grant. (Hear, hear.) But, sir, from the moment that Count Nesselrode I had fixed the meaning of that note—from that moment he showed that if the Vienna note had been signed, it would have been considered equivalent to that note which was presented at Constantinople by the Russian Ambassador — from that moment we not only ceased to press upon Turkey that she should agree to that note, but wo took the more vigorous step of supporting, by force, the independence of the Sultan. (Hear, hear.) The fleet was to go to the Bosphorus and on the 8th of October, orders were given that the fleet should protect the coasts of Turkey in the Black Sea, on the European and Asiatic coasts. I come now, sir, to the next step in these negociations, or rather, in these transactions—I come to what occurred on the 30th day of November, at Sinope. The orders given to the ambassadors were what I have named, and the rmbassa- dors thought it advisable that a certain number of ships should go into the Black Sea that they should visit Varna, and the mouth of the Danube, in order that thev should take means of observing what was going forward in the Black Sea. It so happened, however, at that moment, that the French Government had displaced their ambassa- dor at Constantinople, and had sent another, General Baraguay d'Hilliers. Under these circumstances, the French admiral declined to take the order of an ambassador who was leaving Constantinople, and the ambassador who followed, did not think it advisable to take the course which the English ambassador had desired to have carried out. This was a misfortune, and we know that ships were left at Sinope, and that they were, in consequence, ex- posed to that dreadful calamity which befell them. But I do not think that, under the circumstances which took place, there was any party much to blame in the affair, because I do not believe it would have been possible to provide against every occurrence which might take place in that state of affairs. It would not have been consistent with the safety of the fleet, to have dispersed it in various parts of the Black Sea; for, if it had been so sent out, some attack might have been made at Varna. It was a matter for the exercise of the discretion of the ambassador, and I do not believe that he was in fault in not insisting upon his orders, when they failed to obtain tho concur- rence of the French ambassador and admiral. The disaster which took place at Sinope, was one that must have affected every man in this country with the most painful feelings. (Hear, hear, hear.) Sir, I must say I was greatly surprised at reading the congratulations addressed by the Emperor of Russia, to his officers and his admirals, upon the receipt of the intelligence of the destruction and the butchery at that so-called victory—(cheers)—a victory of some six or seven large line-of-battle ships over six or seven frigates of very inferior quality—(hear, hear)—a vic- tory pushed to the extent of the most dreadful carnage, and with no sort of generosity shovn. (Cheers.) That the advantage of a large and superior force like that, should be a source of glory to the Russians, and a reason for the congratulations of a sovereign to his subjects, does, I own, afflict me with a feeling of the greatest disgust. (Cheers.) Sir, that event was as deeply felt in France as it was felt here, and in consequence, orders were given to the ambassadors at Constantinople, that the English and French fleets should take the command of the Black Sea; that they should not only protect the coast of Turkey, that they should not only protect the flag of Turkey, but that they should likewise prevent reinforcements being sent from one Russian port to another, and that whenever they found a Russian ship of war, they should send it back to Sebastopol or to the nearest port. It is impossible to deny that those orders amounted as near to warlike preparations as possible. (Hear, hear.) There have been, in the course of the last 26 years, in Europe, transactions somewhat resembling this-namely, the blockade of the Texel and of Antwerp, the French occupation of Ancona, the battle of Navarino, and various other transactions carried on without a declaration of war; but from the nature of the orders given by the French and English Governments, no one can be surprised that the Emperor of Russia should withdraw both from London and Paris, his ambassadors. And this leads me to our present situation, which has been justly described as being on the brink of a war. I have stated, as shortly as I could, without argument and with- out quotations, the general course which the British Go- vernment has pursued. We have now to eonsider the prospect before us, and what remains to be done. With regard to diplomatic correspondence respecting terms of peace, there were terms proposed by the ambassadors of the Four Powers, at Constantinople—terms very nearly assented to, at least assented to in such a manner at Constantino le, as to be sent to Vienna by the representatives, and adopted and approved at Vienna by the Conference of the Four Powers. Sir, it does. not appear to me that those terms were derogatory to the dignity of Turkey, nor were they such as were at all unbefitting the Emperor of Russia to accept. Yet, what course did the Emperor of Russia take ? Be it remembered that he is reported to have said, at Olmutz, that he had been asked to agree to the Vienna note; that it afterwards appeared Turkey herself did not agree to it; that he thought it unreasonable to put him in such a position, and that he hoped, when the next terms of peace were proposed, they would be such as Turkey herself would agree to. The four great Powers had exerted them- selves in order to obtain peace, and I must say that, con- dcring those Powers-England, France, Austria, and Prussia—represented all the great powers of Europe, and that the terms they proposed, were proposed with a view to prevent a bloody and costly war extending all over the world, the course adopted by the Emperor of Russia showed a total disregard of the peace of Europe-(hear, 11ear)--au utter contempt of the opinion of Europe, and a disregard of those sovereigns with whom he had been allied. (Hear, hear.) Instead of the acceptance of those propositions, other propositions were sent to Vienna, which shall shortly be laid upon the table of the house, containing very much of a repetition of the original demands and the addition of other terras, one of which was, that the refugees in Turkey of different nations, should be expelled from that country. That article was intended, no doubt, to weaken Turkey, as it would have been a perpetual source of continued re- monstrance, and would have occasioned war at any mo- ment Russia might think fit. Count Buol, the Austrian Minister, in communicatiug those terms to the conference, declared expressly that he did not recommend them for adoption. (Hear, hear.) I was asked, yesterday, whether a letter, represented to have been sent by the Emperor of the French to the Emperor of Russia, was a genuine docu- ment. No doubt that letter is a genuine letter, and it is an attempt made by the Emperor of the French and the Government of France to induce the Emperor of Russia to reconsider the course he has adopted, to evacuate the principalities, which he has wrongly occupied, and to draw up articles, with a Turkish Plenipotentiary, which shall afterwards be submitted to the conference of the four Powers. For my own part, I say that, at all events, there is no concession to Russia in the proposition thus made. I will not attempt to say I entertain a hope that the Em- peror of Russia will accede to that proposition, or that he will abstain from enforcing, with all the power of Russia, those unjustifiable demands which he has hitherto made. (Hear.) What, then, must be our course ? There can be but one, and that must be upon the side of Turkey, de- feating her against the power of Russia. If I am asked further, before we enter upon the Committee of Supply, what are the means we look to, and, in tho terms ol the hon. member for Inverness (Mr. Baillie), what negotiations we propose to make, I should say, in the first place, that there has been an exchange of notes between England and France, promising to co-operate in giving assistance to Turkey, and declaring on the part of both Powers, that 110 selfish interests, and increase of territory or .P^er, is sought for. (Cheers.) Such is the nature 01 ne position in which the two great Powers now stand. They teel that the cause is one, in the first place, of the in ependence of Turkey—a power which has been most cruelly outraged— (loud cheers) a Power which has resisted with great firmness and with ability the unjust demands of the diplo- matic ministers of Russia, and a whieh has resisted with courage and skill, in the field, the united legions of Russia. (Loud cheers.) But sir, the cause is still more. It is to mankind the peace of Europe, of which the Em- peror of Russia is the wanton disturber-(cacers)-and it is for mankind to throw uPon the ^a<1 °* that disturbor, the consequences which he as so agrantly, and, I be- lieve, so imprudently evoked. ( leers.) And it is to mankind the independence, not only of Turkey, but of Germany, and of all European nations. The state of Germany for the last few years has been one, if not abso- lutely of dependence upon the Emperor of Russia, at least one in which independence has not been very loudly asserted. (Hear.) I could not but think, on reading the transactions which took. place last year, at Paris, that there was too much acquiescence on the partof the German Powers in the unjustmable pretensions of Russia. (Cheers.) This house is aware, and I have occasion to relate it with that commendation which I thought was due, that, when the Earl of Malmesbury found that the Emperor of the French meant to be faithful to the engage men's of the c mn- try over which he was called to reign, and that his object was to maintain the peace of Europe, on the part of this country, the willing recognition of the Queen was declared to the new form of Government. But the powers of Germany thought it advisable to wait until the Emperor of Russia had declared his mind on the subject; and the mmd of the Emppror of Russia was, that the Emperor of the French might be acknowledged but that, not having descended from a line which had for centuries occupied the throne, he (the Emperor of Russia) could not call the Emperor of the French his brother. (Laughter.) The Emperor of the French had too much good sense to attach any very great importance to whether he was called my good friend," or "my brother." (Laughter and cheers.) But it was understood that the Powers of Ger and all, desired their representatives to wait at ParI.. not to lecognisc the Emperor of the French, until tM assured that the unusual form of recognition of j peror of Russia had been received so that if the W of the French had chosen to say, as he had a fu t I will stand upon established forms, and I will 110 those forms departed from," not one of those po Germany, who were all ready of themselves to rePj [^1 him as Emperor of the French, and were, moreore 1 to call him their brother, not one of those FowcrSMi have recognised him I say, sir, that that shows of Germany not so independent as one would wis'1, hear.) I cannot but think—and there are grovri11?. toms of it every day—that this violent attempt 00 pi 't of Russia—that these acts, in violation of all :Ig justice, have at length aroused, both in Austriaj Prussia, a sense, that they must consider the Europe before consulting the will of the Emperor ijH My belief is, therefore, although we have no with them-and I state it plainly to the house, are not bound to us to resist in any manner tbe aggression on the part of Russia—still, my beliefktH both tnese nations, constituting the great empirC "a many—divided as Germany is into separate soVerr! 'jiH will be too much impressed with the growing ance and position of that empire—of its 3o,OOO,0"w bitauts, of its enlightenment, of its civilisation, a0(J importance of maintaining its independence-not { care that the aggrandisement of Russia does not ||(jH so formidable as to threaten the independence of Germanic Power. (Hear, hear.) I believe, that in undertaking this contest, even though '>>■ not have the immediate assistance of those t>f, « German Towers, yet they would look on with a V'I! tfl to aid Russia -not to engage themselves to on the contrary, to use all their influence, and, if 11 J their arms, to stop her in her attempted progress quest and of lawless force. I have said that we |jH engagement with France. We have now proposed an engagement with Turkey, by which we shall ef besides other things which are necessary on such ( that Turkey will not agree to any peace with Rn^ ."Vfl we are giving our aid and assistance, without off a and concurrence. That engagement with Turken SH yet been formed; but I have no doubt that, c the manner in which the affairs of Turkey lately conducted, that she will willingly accept tbe assistance which England and France can give bet! the condition I have stated. And, sir, I beg here that, in entering upon that contest, we shall K fl greatest confidence in, and reliance upon, our Frell (Lond cheers.) The conduct of the Emperor of We ti during the whole of the transactions, has been s°.j frank, and so straightforward, that it is imposSlb jtopH place the utmost reliance in him and in his G0\fj 5ù (Great cheering.) With respect to the exertions 1 NB uecessary for us to make, without at present sfj the efforts that we may hereafter be called vf A but confining myself to what, at the very begin" j I ,.W struggle, it will be incumbent onus to ado state that we sha 1 think it necessary, in the the year, to add no less a sum than £ 3,000,000 !tel to the amount that was asked for last year. I B >foM said that this is a very large increase of our army establishments. "But, I say again, as the tl gentleman has said, and which I also stated in ning of my speech, that these resources are pt but, at the same time, if you think that the n1"1 given to them can be better confided to other hao^ that to be your opinion by some early vote, an"v direction of the resources of this empire in J and abler hands. But if you do not take that p you confide them to us, then we shall expect 1°A dence in allowing us to carry on these transact^ ing to the best of our judgment, without which 'Tl no success can possibly take place. (Hear, he&h A lect that success in war depends upon seer0s?$ upon combination, depends upon rapidity, and j JSj inconsistent with success, to explain your JS; (Loud cheers.) I am not asking too much, thcr^ I ask you to adopt one or the other of those and either place the Government of the war in b or, if not, then to give to us that confidence £ cessary successfully to carry it on. It is not t° M tjj j| ten that war brings with it increased burdens- J lIIett¡ man suppose that we can enter upon a strugS W la. Emperor of Russia in support of a power cogjV feeble, without making considerable efforts, calliug upon the people to bear burdens greotC have had to sustain during a time when we with all the world. If they are not prepared t0. \i burdens, let them not enter into this war; 1 if they do enter into this war, endeavonr to" 71 wl successful issue. (Cheers.) For my part, Ifde fr lette pectcdly the Emperor of Russia should rcC5r,fopfi former demands, and at the sight of all f gtfi proving his conduct, and of two of the mos'c i nations of Europe being prepared to act in j(r sary, against him, he should acknowledge ence and integrity of the Porte in the 00 L<F which it could be satisfactorily done—I shall* all, rejoice to be spared the efforts and the uM conflict. (Hear, hear.) But, if that is not 1 peace is no longer consistent with our 4" .J. With our duty to Europe, and with o*r du,tJ J -if the ambition of this enormous power hasU j Li a pitch that even its moderation is more J Hd the ambition of other States—if Russia w11^, tented with anything leas than the subjtfp, jj? whole empire of Turkey and the possession <> lIU nople itself-if such are her feelings, and ^fs objects, then we can only endeavour to enter &^ rA test with a stout heart. (Cheers.) May G° right! and, for my part, I will willingly and tbe responsibility. (The noble lord res11. be amid loud cheers from both sides of the hous<^ m N Mr. Cobden moved the adjournment of tbe j*6t-S( Lord John Russell hoped the estimates j voted. Mr. Disraeli complimented the noble v A speech, which he declared to be worthy of h1 1 occasion, but severely condemned that 0 m Graham. He complained that himself^ acted with him, would have voted the esti'119 yoy debate took place, but the motion had ^eCtl frUj ward by an independent member, and it °v& to be disposed of before the estimates w<?r jl these estimates no opposition would be offere I Mo)) Lord John Russell then acceded to the roø6' I ;jtttl\ journment, and the house shortly afterwards I fjlt