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ENGLAND'S FIELD ARMY. (From the Times.") A good way of ascertaining what our real position is will, wo think, be to imagine oursdrei in the posi- tion of a staff officer addressed by the Duke of Cam- bridge as follows: "Draw up a memorandum showing both how many troops, &c., we have available for an expedition—say to Turkey—and the steps neces- sary to be taken to put an army destined for that purpose together." The first step is to ascertain the number of efficient fighting men available, for there is a difference greater than civilians would imagine between the pape** and the real strength of an army. On reference to the Army Estimates for the current year, we find that the total number of men voted by Parliament is 133,720, including staffs of brigade depots to be formed from the staff of the auxiliary forces. Of these, about 29,000 are in the colonies* leaving at home 104,720 of all ranks. To these must be added 20,000 men—according to the latest calculation-first-elass Army Reserve and 30,000 Militia Reserve. Thus we have 154,720 of all ranks liable to serve abroad and available— on paper—for an expedition to Turkey or elsewhere. A Corps d'Armee contains 36,805 of all ranks, and it might appear from the above that we could easily despatch an army of three corps. A careful analysis, however, will show that we should be rather straining our resources and leaving ourselves without reserves were we to do so. Moreover, the strength of the cavalry is insuf- ficient for much more than two corps and a body of etappen troops. On the assumption that the landing would be effected in Turkey, the etwppen troops could scarcely be set down at less than live battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, one company of engineers, two batteries of field, and two of garrison artillery. A naval brigade and a body of marines might be landed to assist in holding the point of'dis- embarcation, but the fleet itself would be actively em- ployed, and could not make a large contribution. Let us now see how the infantry are to be supplied. Two corps and five etappen battalions would require 47 battalions of 1097 of all ranks each. The Guards, seven battalions strong, with a total strength of 5950 of all ranks, would as umal fur- nish a brigade of three battalions, each of which, by drawing on the home battalions, could be easily raised to a war strength. Thus we need only take into consideration 44 batta- lions of line infantry. In the Mediterranean are 12 battalions, each 917 of all ranks strong. These could furnish six battalions, 1001 strong each, volunteers being obtained from the battalions left in garrison to fill up the expeditionary battalions, and militia regi- mentis being ordered out from home to take the place of the latter. That leaves 35 line battalions to be sent from England. There are at present 64 battalions, of whom 12 have an establishment of 903, four of 609, and the remainder of 603 of all ranD, r Thereare, however, many eliminations to be made from' each battalion before sending it on an expedition. There are the wanting to complete," men absent but not yet struck off the rolls, men in hospital or prison, men from age or some physical disability nwflt for active service, undrilled recruits, and lads who, being under 20, are, according to the highest authorities, incapable of supporting the hardships and fatigues of a campaign. On an average, two out of three of the infantry recruits will not attain the age of 20 under a year, and then they will be a. year younger than the average age or OoDtiDeatat. recruits after being dismissed drill. We may," therefore, fairly deduct 10 per cent. from the regi- r ments on the lower establishment and 15 ftom those on the higher establishment for this eamse. There is a larger proportion of recruits iD.!t}te stronger than in the weaker regiments; hence the higher percentage of deductions- from the former. Add 5 per cent. for other causes, and that is a low estimate, for several regiments are much below their establishments. By this process 12 battalions would be reduced to about 727 of all ranks, and the remaining 26 out of the 88 tofeersant-frem home to about 502.. It would be necessary, in order to bringr all 38 battalions to the regnlated vter strength of 1097 of all ranks, to add about 20,000 men. Of the 20,000 men of theftnt class army reserve, probably about 18,000 are infamry, and about 17,000 of thele might be reckoned on as fit to serve and obeying the sum- mons. All these would be excellent men in every respect. Of the militia reserve of nominally 30,000 men, probably 20,000 infantry, men fit to serve, would come forward. From these 3000 good men could be picked to complete the required augmentation of the expeditionary battalions. This would leave 17,000 men. to fill up the gape in the garrison battalions at Malta and Gibraltar, to supply men for subsidiary corps, and to provide. first reserve at Malta. The result of this calculation is satisfactory as regards numbers, for, as we have shown, we could send out two corps, a body of etappen troops, provide a first reserve, complete the regular battalions left in the Mediterranean, expand the Army Service and Army Hospital Corps, have fun depdts in England, and yet possess 26 line bat- talions, each about 600 strong, besides four battalions of Guards, in the United Kingdom. These with the second-class army reserve, the militia and the volun- teers would constitute a force quite sufficient for home defence. ¡


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