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It was recently stated in an authontativ e quarter that at tile oonuneiiceiiibiil oi the year the Russian armies had a superiority of two or three to the German or .Austro- Huii^arian one- Tins lends point to the statement of another correspondent, ill*. Penis, who is also well in touch with French official circles, that the actual reduc- tion in the German lurces cai the iiua-iun front for employment., upon theW est hLoS been very small. It is placed its low as three email divisions, or 30,000 meu, one tweuty- ftith of the German divisions opposed to the Russians. So few troops have been moved because "the lino /had already been so thinned that nothing else (than a separate peace, with Russia) would enable the Germans to make a larger withdrawal." This is gratifying confirmation of the enemy's weakness upon the Eastern iroitt, for there would certainl y have been other- wise a considerably larger transference cf troops. It frees Ru&sm from the implied reproach that her military passivity had added directly, as well as indirectly, to the military burdens of the Western Allies, and it justifies the inference that the enemy still entertains a serious apprehension of danger from the Russian armies, in spite of their temporary disorganisation, since there would have been otherwise a much larger draft upon the Eastern army. is pointed out that Russia has now a great opportunity of precipitating the end. The German forces in the West have been used up in repelling the Allied assaults, and are depleted, disor- ganised and weary. Since the bitttle of Arras there has Leen a very slight increase in the total number of the German divisions in the West, but the increase is accounted for by using scraps and odds and ends of new formations, and there has been no large influx of new strength to the enemy, either from Russia or from the depots in the interior. A reserve of twelve divisions it. kept in hand, but it is not sufficient to deal with any general resumption of the Allied offensive; and all precedents tell us that in due tin;* » the steady Anglo-French pounding will bfc taken up again, and the wtury German troops will have again to face an ordeal V'hich they frankly dread. Brusiloff, by all that we know of him, will fct-rike, as "in honour bound," at the earliest moment, and whether he chooses the Ger- man or the Austro-Hungarian line as the 1 scene of attack, all the conditions would ap pear propitious. Since last year the nia- terial equipment of the Russian Army has steadily improved, thanks to the work and the sacrifices of the Western Allies, whilst the political development* in the Dual Mon- archy have still further weakened the bonds which patch together the rickety edifice of the Austro-Hungarian armies. the Italian labours on the Carso have drawn probably a larger proportion oi the Au?tro-Hun?ar- ians iroro the I?aat?in wmt than has been the cafo in the reaction betwen the French and the Russian fronts, and still further cut into the waning resources of the Austro- 1 Hungarians. If the Allies have failed to reap the benefits cf a continual offensive East and West, v.e have at least still played havoc with the enemy's strength and pinned down the bulk of his forces. Substantially the conditions remain the fcarflo for the prospects of a future attack by the Allies upon the lines originally planned. The fighting in the West has weakened the Germans more than the Allies, the enemy's forces are still tied down, and Russia has more than three months in which to deal her ■bl<Vw. It is-u seless to argue that becauile an the fighting of the years 1915, 1916, and in- deed of 1917 so far as it has been carried on, has been in a sense indecisive, in that it has not changed the political situation materi- allv to the benefit of the Allies, this, inde- oitsion will continue. The, enemy argues so, i r.^4.vhas ev^ry reason to do w" heaiuse it precisely suits him to call a, ilraw when he; Itolds so ma.ny favourable cards. His argu- ment, that a military decision cannot be at-! tained under modem conditions, iis a danger- j u one for the Allied peoples to listen to; it is so subtly calculated to lull them into a.! v sense of the hopelessness of continuing a barren war foredoomed to a 6terile issue. I We have to put into practice the virtues Of fortitude and endurance, which we pride ourselves upon. An indecision of result is even harder to put up with than actual de- fea,t, because there is the stimulus of an en- deavour to retrieve the latter, whilst a sense of hopelessness is engendered sooner cr later when the battle rages for weary months with no sign of a conclusion. We must re- member how in the South African war the struggle appeared to be eternal and the enemy's strength perennial. Yet the end came at last. The circunfstances are dif- ferent to-day in that the combatants on wither side are vowed to irreconcilable objec- tives, and that they are not matched in an honourable fight, but that it is rather a war in which one side endeavours to punish a I gigantic crime and to restrain its evil effects. But it is still too early by far to accept the enemy s declaration, which is so obviously suited to his own ends and needs, and to none others. We are a curious people, whom victory, because it s partial and not over- whelming, wearies, in some casee, more than p, succession of defeats even would.

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